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Parties are entitled to have their theories of the case 
presented to the jury in the form of instructions only if they 
are supported by the evidence. Powers v. Gene's Building 
Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing an unavoidable 
accident defense theory to be presented to the jury? 
Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents questions of law only, the appellate 
courts grant no particular deference to the trial court's 
rulings. A party is entitled to have his theories of the case 
submitted to the jury provided there is competent evidence to 
support them. Failure to give requested instructions is 
reversible error if it tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party or erroneously advises on 
the law. Carpet Barn, 786 P.2d at 775. 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment NOV? 
The Utah appellate courts review denial of motions for 
directed verdict and, correlatively, motions for judgment NOV, 
under the same standard as applied to the trial court: MA 
motion for a directed verdict requires the trial court to 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom it is directed. The case should not be taken 
from the jury where there is substantial dispute in the 
evidence . . . . On appeal, this Court applies the same 
rules." Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co. . 781 P.2d 445, 451 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
4. Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiff's Motion To 
Have Costs Taxed By The Court? 
The trial court can exercise reasonable discretion in 
regard to the allowance of costs, and has a duty to guard 
against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof. Morcran 
v
« Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Morc*an-
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules and statutes are relevant to tne 
issues presented on this appeal. The full text of each of these 
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rules and statutes is contained in the Addendum, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 50 
Utah R. Civ. P. 51 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 
Utah Code Annotated 1993: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-8 (1993) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This case is a negligence action, sounding in tort, brought by 
plaintiff, Anna Anderson, against defendant, Leonard D. Sharp, for 
injuries suffered by plaintiff resulting from an automobile 
accident with defendant. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court. 
The complaint in this action was filed on May 15, 1989. (R. 
1-2) The case was tried, for the first time, on August 24, 25, and 
26, 1992. (R. 250-53) Because of various errors, the court felt 
is necessary to order a mistrial. (R. 250) Accordingly, the case 
was retried on November 2, 3, and 4, 1993. (R. 340-44) On 
November 4, 1993, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
defendant, (R. 350-54), finding that defendant was not negligent. 
(R. 354) 
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On or about November 9, 1994, defendant filed a Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements with the court. (R. 355-58) Plaintiff, on 
or about November 18, 1993, filed two motions: One for Judgment 
NOV or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial, (R. 359-60), and the 
other to have costs taxed by the court. (R. 3 66) On December 9, 
1993, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs two 
motions. (R. 481-82) 
On or about January 10, 1994, plaintiff filed her Notice of 
Appeal. (R. 486) Plaintiff filed a Motion for Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal on or about February 24, 1994. (R. 491-96) The 
court granted this motion, upon the filing of a supersedeas bond in 
the amount of $3,000, on July 9, 1994. The case was poured over 
from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition on or about March 2, 1994. (R. 503) 
Statement of the Facts. 
The accident at issue occurred on March 10, 1988 at 
approximately 10:00 a.m., in Utah county, on the northbound lanes 
of the 1-15 freeway, just south of the point of the mountain. (T. 
73) There had been a snowstorm the previous night, which had 
cleared up prior to the accident, and from which the road crews had 
been cleaning up that morning. (T. 74) 
The plaintiff, Anna Anderson, testified about the accident as 
follows: 
On the morning of March 10, 1988, at approximately 9:00 a.m., 
she left Provo and began to travel northbound on 1-15, intending to 
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go to Salt Lake City. (T. 70-71) At the time she set out, the road 
was clear and the conditions were sunny. (T. 72) When she got to 
Lehi, just north of a brick company located just off the freeway, 
it began to get cloudy, (T. 72) , and became windy and wet, with 
some blowing snow. (T. 73) 
She came upon a snow plow, which was travelling northbound, 
straddling the right and emergency lanes, and shovelling snow. (T. 
74) The snowplow was travelling at about thirty miles per hour. 
(T. 75) Concerned about the snow plow, she signalled, changed from 
the right lane, in which she had been travelling, into the center 
lane, and passed the snow plow. (T. 76) She felt that this would 
be easier because snow was blowing and the center lane was clearer, 
(T. 76, 110) , although she did not feel that there was any 
particular hazard in passing the snow plow. (T. 76) 
The wind was blowing a great deal at that time, the roadway 
was wet, and snow was blowing up ahead of her. (T. 76) l She was 
travelling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour, which she 
considered to be a safe speed. (T. 77)2 A car passed her in the 
1
 Mrs. Anderson stated in her testimony in the prior trial that "when the wind was blowing the 
snow it was, like I said, a sheet. It was more like cheesecloth. You could see, but it was still - it 
was blowing hard. And I saw cars ahead of me - 1 can't tell you exactly how, but I saw them braking 
and I thought maybe I better slow down a little, too; there might be somebody in front of me that — 
I don't know, because it was kind of blinding." (T. 116 quoting prior T. 320) 
2
 In her affidavit, Mrs. Anderson stated that she had been travelling at 45 miles per hour and, on 
cross-examination, indicated that her estimate could have been off by as much as ten miles per hour, 
but no more. (T. 104) 
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left lane, going quite fast. (T. 75) Mr. Sharp was nowhere around 
at that time. (T. 118) 
"Quite a ways" ahead of her, she saw a brake light and became 
concerned, (T. 77), so took her foot off the gas pedal and slowed 
down. (T. 75) She was in fourth gear at that time, and "didn't 
slow enough to make a difference to slow in changing gears." (T. 
77-78)3 She doesn't remember if she put on her brakes or not. (T. 
77-78) 
The accident occurred a "couple minutes" after she passed the 
snowplow. (T. 77) Immediately before the collision, she looked in 
her rear view mirror and saw Mr. Sharp "coming up quite fast." (T. 
78) She saw his face and knew she was going to get hit. (T. 78) 
This was her very first awareness that Mr. Sharp was following her 
in the center lane. (T. 118) She did not speed up because she was 
going as fast as she could, (T. 120) , and didn't change lanes 
because there was no time to think about it, (T. 12 0) , but 
stiffened up and gritted her teeth to brace for the impact. (T. 78) 
Mr. Sharp then crashed into her. (T. 79) She was pushed 
forward and her car fishtailed. (T. 79) This was a "very abrupt . 
. . strong shove forward." (T. 79) She applied her brakes, trying 
to stop, which made her fishtail "a little bit more." (T. 114) She 
was extremely frightened. (T. 79) 
3
 Mrs. Anderson, in her prior testimony, stated: "If you slow down very much you have to shift. 
I didn't have to shift because I was still going at a high enough speed I looked up in my rear view 
mirror, hoping nobody was going to come up behind me, and that's when I saw the man . . . " (T. 
114) 
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After the impact, Mrs. Anderson pulled her vehicle to the 
right side of the road. (T. 79) Mr. Sharp's car followed her. (T. 
79) Mr. Sharp came to her door after she stopped, and asked her if 
she was all right. (T. 79) The snow plow came by, honked his horn, 
and went ahead. (T. 80) 
The defendant, Leonard D. Sharp, testified about the accident 
as follows: 
On the morning of March 10, 1988, he travelled southbound, 
from Midvale, Utah, to the brick yard north of Lehi off of 1-15 to 
obtain some sample bricks. (T. 165) Although it had stormed 
through the night, the weather was clear. (T. 165) As he left the 
brick yard and got on the freeway, going northbound, he saw the 
snow plow and Mrs. Anderson's vehicle ahead of him. (T. 166) He 
observed that the snow plow and Mrs. Anderson were adjacent to each 
other, (T. 184) ,4 and that they were at least a football field 
length ahead of him at that time. (T. 168)5 He did not observe 
Mrs. Anderson pass the snow plow, (T. 185) , and did not notice 
whether she was going faster than the snow plow or at the same 
speed. (T. 186-87) The snow plow was off the shoulder of the road, 
proceeding northbound, and was not pushing any snow. (T. 166) 
4
 Mr. Sharp also testified that he could not judge Mrs. Anderson's position relative to the snow 
plow. (T. 166) 
5
 Mr. Sharp's testimony on this point is contradictory: Later, on cross-examination, he stated that 
when he first saw Mrs. Anderson, she could have been a half mile or a mile in front of him. (T. 183-
84) He later equivocated about his ability to estimate distances, even though he was a self-employed 
stone mason who did his own estimating. (T. 193) In the prior trial, he testified that Mrs. Anderson 
was only one-half to three-quarters of a football field away from him. (T. 198) 
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Although traffic was very light at the time, (T. 198) , he saw 
several vehicles ahead of Mrs. Anderson. (T. 165) At that time, he 
was travelling between fifty and fifty-five miles per hour, (T. 
168), and was gaining on the snow plow, (T. 185), even though he 
did not have an estimate as to how fast the snowplow was going. (T. 
189) 
As he got closer to Mrs. Anderson and the snowplow, a car 
began to pass him in the left lane. (T. 166) At that time, he was 
"looking to go into that lane" after the car passed him "because 
[he] was gaining on Mrs. Anderson." (T. 166-67) At that time, the 
snow plow, which was still ahead of him, hit some snow and totally 
blocked his vision. (T. 167, 185) He couldn't see Mrs. Anderson's 
car. (T. 167) This was the only time Mrs. Anderson's car left his 
range of vision. (T. 185) He didn't see any brake lights. (T. 169) 
Mr. Sharp's testimony as to what he did next is contradictory: 
First, he stated that he stopped "at the same speed as the car that 
was passing him," (T. 167), and, later, stated that he "applied his 
brakes lightly, just braking to keep out of the vision he didn't 
have." (T. 167) "Then all of a sudden, the car was here." (T. 167) 
He realized "we were going to hit if she didn't push on her gas." 
(T. 169) He put more pressure on his brake and then "bumped" Mrs. 
Anderson. (T. 167) He estimated that he was going between five to 
ten miles per hour at the point of collision. (T. 196) 
He then followed Mrs. Anderson off the road. (T. 170) He 
didn't pass the snow plow, which was then in front of Mrs. 
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Anderson. (T. 170-71) The snow plow stopped, and its driver told 
Mr. Sharp to get back in his car. (T. 171) 
Mr. Sharp acknowledged that it was within the range of his 
experience that snow plows occasionally hit snow and plowed it, and 
that snow flies from a plow when it hits a drift. (T. 191) 
Mrs. Anderson sought reimbursement of damages from Mr. Sharp 
by bringing this action. 
Prior to trial, the parties requested certain jury 
instructions. Plaintiff requested a rear-end presumption 
instruction, which provided as follows: 
In most cases where one car "rear-ends" another, it 
accords with common sense and experience to believe that the 
following car has disregarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead 
and to keep the car under control, and is, therefore, at 
fault. But such a conclusion is not necessarily always 
correct. It may depend upon the particular circumstances. 
Bullock v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975). 
(R. 237) Defendant requested an unavoidable accident instruction, 
which provided that: 
The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. An 
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such a manner 
that it cannot justly be said to have been proximately 
caused by negligence as those terms are herein defined. 
In the event a party is damaged by an unavoidable 
accident, he has no right to recover, since the law 
requires that a person be injured by the fault or 
negligence of another as a prerequisite to any right to 
recover damages. JIFU 16.1, page 53 
(R. 100) 
After Mr. Sharp's testimony, defendant's counsel, Mr. 
Peatross, moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the facts 
were undisputed and it was an unavoidable accident, "contrary to 
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what's been discussed so far regarding the recent case of Randall 
[sic] versus Allen." (T. 203) 
Mr. Howard, plaintiff's counsel, responded that "you can't run 
into the back of a vehicle without a logical explanation," that the 
defendant had to make the explanation, and, otherwise, that the 
inference was that of negligence. (T. 206) 
The court provided counsel with the instructions it planned to 
use. (T. 2 06) Mr. Howard objected to many of the instructions. 
The following dialogue ensued: 
Mr. Howard: I have a directed verdict instruction. 
The Court: I can tell you right now I won't give it. 
Mr. Howard: I don't think you should say that, judge. 
It seems to me it's [sic] absolutely mandatory. But if you 
don't five [sic] it you certainly ought to reserve it rather 
than deny it, because that jury instruction is an untoward 
thing and you could escape the thing by granting the motion 
post-verdict. 
Mr. Peatross: My fellow caught in a snow storm didn't do 
anything wrong. 
The Court: Despite the ruling of the supreme court, I 
don't think it eliminates the of [sic] acts of God which may 
be involved. 
Mr. Howard: You mean a snow plow operator? 
The Court: They could find the snow and blizzard 
conditions are an act of God and not caused by anyone. I 
won't say that is or isn't an unavoidable accident and I won't 
instruct on that, but - -
Mr. Howard: The court ought not to allow the jury to 
speculate on matters of that subject. 
Mr. Peatross: We've got quite a bit on the subject from 
your client. 
Mr. Howard: On acts of God? 
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Mr. Peatross: On snow. We can't bring God in, but we 
can talk about the weather. 
Mr. Howard: The weather is something that's obvious to 
you and you can arrive in accordance with it. The fact it's 
snowing doesn't eliminate the responsibility of a driver to 
avoid hitting cars in front of him. That's why I'm entitled 
to a directed verdict. 
The Court: I don't agree with that. 
Mr. Howard: Think about it, judge. 
The Court: I have. I've heard all of your client's 
testimony, every word of it. 
Mr. Howard: My view is it's my responsibility to keep 
you from falling into error. 
The Court: I really appreciate that, too. 
215-16) 
Counsel then excepted and objected to the jury instructions. 
Peatross stated: 
In our original instructions submitted, which were 
submitted before the previous trial — it was before the 
case of Randall [sic] versus Allen — we included an 
unavoidable accident instruction. I think it was similar 
to MUJI 3.3. And for the record, I excepted not giving 
that, because I think the court was in error in Randall 
[sic] versus Allen, and if they were to address that 
matter again they would change their minds. 
217) Mr. Peatross again moved for a directed verdict. (T. 
) 
Mr. Howard also moved again for a directed verdict. (T. 217) 
also objected to the instruction of the court, as follows: 
I also object and except to the instruction of the 
court upon the following grounds, that there are other 
instructions which tend to confuse the jury. The 
instructions as given are poorly organized. The 
instructions given are redundant, many to each other. 
And consequently, they tend to confuse the jury. 
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I also object on the basis that the instructions as a 
whole are overly emphatic of the defendant's theory of the 
case. And I also object that intermingled among the 
instructions is a general misstatement of the law pertaining 
to this case. And with specificity I object to instruction 
#6, because it's redundant to instructions 4 and 5. And that 
would mean that 4 and 5 are redundant to 6, so all three are 
redundant to each other. 
I also object to instruction #7 because it is 
redundant to 4 and 5 and 6. 
I object to instruction #8 because I don't believe the 
instruction has any place in any lawsuit because it tends to 
emphasize one party's position over another. The court has 
adequately instructed the jury upon what they can find, and it 
is not necessary for the court to instruct on sympathy. 
I object to instruction #10 for it's [sic] total 
misstatement of the law and favors the defendant's position of 
the case into the issues to be resolved by the jury, the 
question of unavoidable accident. Second sentence of 
paragraph 1 is a misstatement of the law which is — which 
will confuse the jury and allow them to speculate on circum-
stances and events that are outside the purview of the jury. 
I object to instruction #16, which is the sudden 
emergency instruction, because there is no foundation or basis 
in the facts of this case to give such an instruction. And it 
is error to allow the jury to speculate on an erroneous theory 
of the law. 
I object to instruction #20 as modified because there 
isn't any reason for the jury to consider lost earnings. 
I object to instruction #26, the chance instruction on 
the basis it's [sic] unnecessary in reagard to other 
instructions given. 
(T. 218-19) 
Mr. Howard then gave his closing argument. (T. 222) Mr. 
Peatross followed with his closing argument. (T. 222-243) (The 
text of his closing argument is contained, in full, in the 
Appendix.) In this argument, Mr. Peatross, in essence, used an 
unavoidable accident theory. 
12 
Upon the conclusion of the closing arguments, Mr. Howard 
reiterated his motion for a directed verdict against defendant, 
stating 
I am sincere in my belief the court should direct a verdict to 
the plaintiff on the basis that the plaintiff has established 
by prime [sic] facie evidence — I should say conclusively 
established, conclusively established the negligence of the 
defendant and that reasonable men would not differ on that 
subject. 
(T. 245) Mr. Howard also moved for a directed verdict on the issue 
of plaintiff's negligence, requesting that the court instruct the 
jury, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not negligent. (T. 
245) The court took the motion under advisement. (R. 24 5) 
After the jury returned the verdict in favor of defendant, Mr. 
Howard orally moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (T. 
249) On or about November 9, 1994, defendant filed with the 
court a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. (R. 3 55-58). This 
memorandum included, among other things, the costs of seven 
depositions, including those of Leonard Sharp, for $107.45; Anna 
Anderson, for $107.45; Michael Sabey, for $147.00; Greg DuVal, for 
$39.40; Leonard Sharp, for $39.40; Anna Anderson, for $233.70; and 
David Beaufort, for $97.02; as well as the cost of the prior trial 
transcript, for $925.00. (R. 356-67) No explanation for these 
deposition costs, other than the following statement by Mr. 
Peatross, was included: 
JEFFREY C. PEATROSS, being duly sworn, says that he 
is the attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled 
action, and as such, is better informed relative to the 
above costs and disbursements than the said defendant. 
That the items contained in the Memorandum are correct to 
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best of the affiant's knowledge and belief, and that the 
said disbursements have been necessarily incurred in said 
action. 
(R. 356) 
Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Judgment NOV or, ,in the 
Alternative, for a New Trial on or about November 18, 1993, 
alleging that the trial court erred in: (1) presenting defendant's 
theory of unavoidable accident as a possible and acceptable defense 
to the jury; (2) conducting voir dire and in denying the plain-
tiff's requested voir dire examination; (3) refusing to instruct 
the jury that there was a presumption in favor of defendant under 
the circumstances of the case; and (4) failing to enter judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict when defendant failed to rebut the 
presumption. (R. 359-60) Plaintiff also submitted a Motion to 
Have Costs Taxed by the Court on November 18, 1993, (R. 366), 
arguing that defendant failed to carry his burden of proving the 
depositions at issue were reasonably necessary. (R. 369) 
On December 2, 1993, the trial court submitted its memorandum 
decision on the matter, ruling on plaintiff's motions for Judgment 
NOV and to Tax Costs by the Court, denying both motions. (R. 479-
80) The court stated, in relevant part: 
The Plaintiff first asks for Judgment NOV because the 
Court gave a jury instruction on the "unavoidable accident." 
A closer reading of the jury instructions reveals that this 
instruction was scheduled to be given in the first trial that 
ended in a mistrial. As discussed with counsel, the Court 
recognized this instruction is now inappropriate and it was 
never given to the jury in this case. Plaintiff's argument 
[sic] without foundation. 
14 
Plaintiff finally argues that as a matter of law the 
Defendant should be presumed negligent in rear-end collisions. 
This is not the law in Utah and the facts do not support such 
a presumption in this case. 
The Court finds the costs as submitted by the Defendant 
to be reasonable and necessary and sets the amount at 
$2100.17. 
(R. 479-80) An order denying plaintiff's motions was entered on 
December 9, 1993. (R. 481-82) 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IN A REAR END AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT. 
Plaintiff requested a jury instruction relating to the 
presumption of negligence of a defendant in a rear-end collision. 
The trial court refused to give such an instruction, reasoning that 
it was not the law in Utah. One who rear-ends a vehicle under 
normal circumstances is presumed to be negligent, in the absence of 
the leading vehicle's fault. Although the Utah courts have 
rejected a per se liability theory in rear-end collisions, the 
presumption at issue does not create a per se liability because it 
is rebuttable. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is well 
recognized in Utah. The rear-end collision presumption is an 
application of res ipsa loquitur, so is compatible with existing 
Utah law. Plaintiff adduced evidence sufficient to make a prima 
facie showing necessary to qualify to use a rear-end collision 
instruction. Where evidence supports the giving of an instruction, 
the party is entitled to have its theory of the case presented 
through the instruction. The trial court refused to give the 
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instruction to which plaintiff was entitled and, accordingly, 
committed reversible error• 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESENTING AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT 
THEORY TO THE JURY. 
The use of unavoidable accident instructions under any 
circumstances was prohibited by the Utah Supreme Court in Randle v. 
Allen, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1993) . An unavoidable accident theory 
was presented to the jury through the trial court's instructions 
and defendant's counsel's closing argument. Because of the 
repetitive and unbalanced nature of an unavoidable accident 
instruction, and other instructions given by the trial court, the 
jury was confused because of the improper emphasis placed upon 
defendant's theory of the case. Because the evidence indicates 
that at least one of the parties may have been negligent, an 
unavoidable accident instruction is even more confusing, creating 
additional error. Because there is a substantial probability that 
the jurors were misled by the presentation of the unavoidable 
accident theory, the trial court committed reversible error. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL, TO PLAINTIFF. 
Judgment NOV should be granted if, viewing the evidence most 
favorably to the non-movant, there is no competent evidence 
supporting the verdict. Because plaintiff brought sufficient 
evidence to support the giving of a rear-end collision instruction, 
and defendant failed to rebut this presumption, even considering 
the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, there is no 
16 
competent evidence supporting the verdict, and judgment NOV is 
proper. 
Alternatively, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial under Rule 
59(a)(1) and (7) because the trial courts failure to present 
plaintiff's rear-end collision theory, coupled with its 
presentation of defendant's unavoidable accident theory to the jury 
was, (1) an abuse of discretion, and (2) an error in the law. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO HAVE 
COSTS TAXED BY THE COURT. 
Rule 54(d) is generally interpreted very narrowly as to what 
costs may be taxed against a losing party. Because deposition 
costs are not included in the wording of the Rule or the associated 
statutes, allowing them to be taxed is an exception to the rule. 
This exception is currently allowed if depositions are taken in 
good faith and are essential for the development and presentation 
of the case. 
This exception to the Rule should be abandoned by this Court 
because: (1) the exception does violence to the express wording of 
the Rule; (2) the standards for determining which depositions 
should be taxed are unworkable; (3) the exception is inconsistent 
with the rule that other necessary costs of litigation are 
disallowed; (4) the exception is not conducive to judicial economy; 
and (5) the exception results in fundamental unfairness. 
Further, defendant has not carried his burden of proof in 
showing that the depositions were reasonably necessary, and the 
17 
transcript from the prior trial was not a reasonable expense, 
failing to justify the trial court's award of costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
PRESUMPTION OP NEGLIGENCE IN A REAR END AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT. 
A. The Trial Court Refused To Give Plaintiff's Requested 
Rear-End Collision Instruction. 
Plaintiff's counsel requested a jury instruction relating to 
the presumption of negligence of a defendant in a rear-end 
collision, which provided as follows: 
In most cases where one car "rear-ends" another, it accords 
with common sense and experience to believe that the following 
car has disregarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead and to 
keep the car under control, and is, therefore, at fault. But 
such a conclusion is not necessarily always correct. It may 
depend upon the particular circumstances. Bullock v. Ungrich-
t, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975). 
After discussion of the issue throughout the trial, the trial 
court, nevertheless, refused to give plaintiff's requested 
instruction. In its memorandum decision, the trial court, 
responding to the same issue raised in plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment NOV, set forth its reasoning applicable to the denial of 
the instruction as follows: "Plaintiff finally argues as a matter 
of law the Defendant should be presumed negligent in rear-end 
collisions. This is not the law in Utah and the facts do not 
support such a presumption in this case." (R. 479-80) 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a 
matter of law. Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 
2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, the Utah appellate courts 
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review a trial court's instructions for correctness only, giving 
them no particular deference. Id. Plaintiff believes that the 
trial court's reasoning and denial of the instruction is erroneous 
as a matter of law, and its refusal to give the requested 
instruction constitutes reversible error. 
B. A Driver Who Rear-Ends Another Vehicle Under Normal 
Circumstances Is Generally Presumed To Be Negligent, 
It is commonly held that one who rear-ends a vehicle under 
normal circumstances is presumed to be negligent. Norris v. Gatts, 
738 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1987); Hahn v. Russ. 611 P.2d 66, 67 
(Alaska 1980); Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829, 833 (Colo. 1988). 
In the absence of any fault on the part of the plaintiff, this 
presumption is sufficient to make a prima facie case of negligence. 
Boring v. Bettner, 739 P.2d 884, 885 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). The 
Missouri court described the presumption as 
the doctrine or rule of law which recognizes that if one 
person has his vehicle in a portion of the highway where 
he should have it or is entitled to have it in view of 
the course in which he is proceeding, and some other 
person traveling behind him in the same direction 
overtakes him and permits his vehicle to run into the 
rear of the one ahead, the proof of a collision under 
such circumstances makes out a prima facie case of 
specific negligence against such other person in charge 
of the overtaking vehicle. 
Bettner, 764 P. 2d at 833 (quoting Doggendorf v. St. Louis Public 
Serv. Co., 333 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Mo. Ct. App. I960)) (emphasis in 
original). This presumption applies in cases like the present 
case, where both vehicles involved in the accident were located on 
the road or on the shoulder, were in relatively close proximity at 
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the time of the collision, and were facing the same direction. Id. 
The presumption, also known as the "following car" doctrine, 
is applied as follows: 
We start with the well established rule of law, in 
this jurisdiction, that in the absence of an emergency or 
unusual condition, the following driver is prima facie 
negligent if he runs into the car ahead. . . . When it 
can be said, as a matter of law, that no emergency or 
unusual condition existed, and the following car collides 
with the forward vehicle, the following car's negligence 
is not based upon the necessity to find, as a fact, some 
affirmative act of negligence on his part 
Contrariwise, when the forward car's action is not 
reasonably anticipated, such as a sudden stop at a place 
where none is to be anticipated, then the trier of fact 
must find an affirmative act of negligence by the 
following driver before he can be called negligent even 
though he collided with the forward vehicle. 
Enslow v. Helmke, 611 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). 
Plaintiff's requested instruction is consistent with these 
characteristics of the rear-end presumption.6 
C. The Presumption Is Compatible With Existing Utah 
Precedent. 
1. The Presumption Does Not Create A Per-Se Liability 
Rule Because It is Rebuttable. 
The Utah courts have not specifically addressed the issue of 
a rear-end collision presumption, but have dealt with rear-end 
collisions through negligence analysis, finding that "a motorist 
6
 The rear-end collision instruction used by the Colorado courts provided as follows: 
"'Presumptions' are rules based upon experience or public policy and established in the 
law to assist the jury in ascertaining the truth. 
In this case the law presumes that the defendant drove her car negligently when she 
caused it to collide with the rear of the Plaintiffs vehicle. 
Unless and until the presumption is outweighed by evidence to the contrary which as 
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must consider the presumption with the 
other evidence in arriving at your verdict." Bettner, 764 P.2d at 831-32. 
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who collides with a stationary vehicle on the highway is not guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law without respect to the totality of 
the circumstances." Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P. 2d 
217, 221 (Utah 1983); see also Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1981); Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co, 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); Watters v. Ouerry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 
1978) . The Utah court felt that it was necessary, in rear-end 
collision cases, for the jury to make the allocation of liability 
on the basis of the relative culpability of both parties, and to do 
that, it was necessary for the jury to "assess the reasonableness 
or unreasonableness of the second driver's actions in light of all 
the circumstances, including whatever action it takes to avoid a 
collision, his initial speed, the initial speed of the first car, 
road conditions, traffic conditions, and the like." Harris, 671 
P.2d at 222. 
As the trial court observed, the Utah courts have rejected a 
per se liability approach to rear end collisions. However, the 
presumption at issue, as reflected by plaintiff's requested 
instruction, is not a per se approach to liablity. Contrary to the 
trial court's understanding, the presumption does not make a rear-
end collision defendant liable as a matter of law because the 
presumption may be rebutted. The presumption can be rebutted where 
the preceding driver is negligent or there is otherwise no reason 
to anticipate the driver's conduct. Hahn, 611 P. 2d at 67. 
Accordingly, this presumption does not resolve the issue of 
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liability in the summary manner proscribed by the court, but shifts 
the burden of proof of negligence from the leading to the following 
driver if the following driver cannot show some reasonable reason 
why he rear-ended the leading driver. 
2. The Presumption Is An Application of the Doctrine 
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Which is recognized in Utah, 
Although the Utah courts have not specifically addressed a 
rebuttable presumption of negligence in the case of rear-end 
collisions, well established Utah law is compatible with such a 
presumption. 
The Utah courts accept res ipsa loquitur as an "evidentiary 
doctrine used in a negligence action to establish the defendant's 
duty of care and the breach of that duty.11 Virginia S. v. Salt Lake 
Care Center, 741 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The purpose 
of the doctrine is "to permit one who suffers injury from something 
under the control of another, which ordinarily would not cause 
injury except for the other's negligence, to present his grievance 
to a court or jury on the basis that an inference of negligence may 
reasonably be drawn from such facts, and cast the burden upon the 
other to make proof of what happened." Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 
P. 2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (I960)). The presumption does not 
reach the issue of causation; the plaintiff still has the 
obligation to prove causation. Id. 
In Utah, to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the 
plaintiff must establish the following foundation: 
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The rule . . . is applicable when: (1) The accident was 
of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would 
not have happened had the defendant used due care, (2) 
the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the 
time of the accident under the management and control of 
the defendant, and (3) the accident happened irrespective 
of any participation by the plaintiff. 
Virginia S. , 741 P.2d at 971; accord Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion 
Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1984); Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833. 
The rear end collision presumption fits these requirements, 
making it a subcategory or application of res ipsa loquitur. 
First, it is well settled that rear end accidents normally do not 
occur, under normal circumstances, in the absence of negligence on 
the part of the following driver. See, e.g., Bettner, 764 P.2d at 
833. Second, the vehicle causing a rear end collision is normally 
under the management or control of the following driver. Finally, 
for the presumption to apply, the accident must have happened 
without any fault or negligence on the part of the leading driver. 
See, e.g. , Hahn, 611 P. 2d at 68. The purpose of a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction, like a rear-end collision instruction, is to 
"cast the burden upon [the person who controlled the agency or 
instrumentality causing the injury] to make proof of what 
happened." Kusy, 561 P.2d at 1235 (quoting Anderton, 607 P.2d at 
833) . 
Other jurisdictions have recognized that the rear-end 
presumption is an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
because a rear end accident does not normally occur in the absence 
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of negligence. Norris, 738 P.2d at 348; Boring, 739 P.2d at 885. 
The Colorado court stated that 
[f]rom the admitted facts, which are that defendant was 
in control of an automobile which collided with the rear 
end of plaintiff's automobile without any fault whatever 
on the part of the plaintiff, there is a presumption of 
negligence sufficient to make a prima facie case. "The 
thing itself speaks," or the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applies here, for the simple season [sic] that 
the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to account 
for any cause of the accident not within his knowledge. 
Bettner, 764 P.2d at 832 (quoting Iacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450, 
217 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1950)); Boring, 739 P.2d at 884-85. 
Because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is recognized in 
Utah, and the rear-end collision presumption is simply an 
application of the doctrine, the presumption should also be 
accepted in Utah. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling was 
incorrect as a matter of law. 
C. Plaintiff Was Entitled To A Rear-End Collision 
Instruction* 
It is well settled that a party is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. Jorqensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 
80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); accord Carpet Barn, 786 P.2d at 775. 
The trial court has the duty to cover the theories of both parties 
in its instructions. Pacific Chromalox Division, Emerson Electric 
Co. v. Irev, 787 P.2d 1319, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Plaintiff 
raised this presumption as expressing her theory of the case 
throughout the trial proceedings. 
"Once the elements of res ipsa loquitur have been established, 
the plaintiff is entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction, and 
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it becomes the jury's function, not the trial court's, to weigh 
conflicting evidence." Virginia S., 741 P.2d at 671; accord Kusy, 
681 P.2d at 1235; Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833. A plaintiff who makes 
a prima facie case of negligence is entitled to a rear end 
collision instruction. 
Plaintiff made a prima facie showing sufficient to entitle her 
to a rear-end presumption instruction. She showed that she was 
involved in an accident in which she was travelling northbound on 
1-15 in the center lane, where she had a right to be. She 
testified that she was travelling at a reasonable speed for the 
conditions, and that she did not stop unexpectedly on the roadway. 
There is no dispute that defendant Sharp came up behind her, at a 
faster rate of speed than she was travelling, could not stop or 
slow down in time, and hit the rear of her vehicle. The following 
vehicle was undisputably under the exclusive control of defendant 
Sharp. Third, plaintiff's testimony sets forth evidence that the 
accident occurred irrespective of her participation. Mr. Sharp 
simply ran into her. This showing constitutes a prima facie 
showing of the elements of res ipsa loquitur under Virginia S. and 
other Utah precedents, as well as a prima-facie showing sufficient 
to justify a rear-end collision instruction under Bettner. 
"Even when a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, he is 
entitled to the rear-end collision presumption instruction." 
Boring, 739 P. 2d at 885. That the jury might find that neither 
party was negligent begs the question; if the parties' evidence 
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entitles him to a res ipsa instruction or, similarly, to a rear-end 
collision instruction, he does not lose that entitlement because of 
what the jury found or might find, Kusy, 681 P. 2d at 1235, 
Accordingly, the jury's finding in the present case does not 
determine whether plaintiff should have been entitled to the 
requested instruction. 
This application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not 
violate Utah's ruling against finding negligence as a matter of law 
in a rear end collision because the instruction is a means of 
presenting the leading car's theory of the case to the jury and, 
even though the driver may be entitled to an instruction, whether 
the presumption applies is the jury's province to determine. "When 
a rear-end collision instruction is given to the jury, the jury is 
instructed that the presumption is rebuttable." Bettner, 764 P.2d 
at 832. "[0]nce the elements of res ipsa loquitur have been 
established, it merely permits and does not compel the inference of 
negligence by the fact finder." Kusy, 681 P. 2d at 1235; accord 
Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985). Thus, the use of 
the presumption instruction does not deprive the jury of the 
deliberative function so highly regarded by the Utah court. 
D. The Trial Court's Failure To Give Plaintiff's Requested 
Instruction Was Reversible Error. 
"Failure to give requested instructions is reversible error if 
it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining 
party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the 
law." Jorgensen, 739 P.2d at 82; accord Knapstad, 774 P.2d at 3. 
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"Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory of the 
case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to 
instruct thereon." Watters, 626 P. 2d at 458. Further, "[a]n error 
is reversible if there is a reasonable likelihood that a more 
favorable result would have been obtained by the complaining party 
in the absence of the error." Harris, 671 P.2d at 222. 
Where the evidence supports the giving of a requested rear-end 
collision instruction, trial courts have been found to have 
committed reversible error in refusing to give the instruction. 
See, e.g., Boring, 739 P.2d at 885. The Oklahoma court found that 
by refusing to include a rear-end collision instruction, "the 
applicable law on the issues was withheld from the jury and gives 
rise to a probability that jurors were misled, thereby reaching a 
different conclusion than they would have, but for the refusal to 
give the proposed instruction." Cimarron Feeders v. Tri-County 
Electric Coop., 818 P.2d 901, 903 (Okla. 1991). 
In the present case, the court's failure to give the plain-
tiff's requested rear-end presumption instruction had the result of 
failing to present plaintiff's theory of the case to the jury, so 
insufficiently advised the jury as the law. Plaintiff adduced 
evidence to support this theory, yet the trial court failed and 
refused to give the requested instruction. These factors alone, 
indicate that the trial court committed reversible error. Further, 
because the instruction could have had the effect of shifting the 
burden of proof had the jury found it applicable, there is a 
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reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been 
obtained in the absence of the error. Accordingly, the trial court 
committed reversible error, so its judgment should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESENTING AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT 
THEORY TO THE JURY. 
A. Unavoidable Accident Instructions May Not Be Used Under 
Any Circumstances In Utah. 
In Randle v. Allen, 22 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, the Utah Supreme 
Court struck down the use of unavoidable accident instructions. 
The Randle court observed that an unavoidable accident instruction 
"is not necessary, runs the risk of misleading the jury, and 
suggests that an improper type of analysis might be used to decide 
a case." Id. at 9. The court, accordingly, rejected such 
instructions for use under any circumstances. Id. at 10. 
The instruction struck down in Randle stated: 
In the law we recognize what we term as unavoidable 
or inevitable accidents. These terms do not mean 
literally that it was not possible for such an accident 
to be avoided. They simply denote an accident that 
occurred without having been proximately caused by 
negligence. Even if such an accident could have been 
avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill 
or caution, still no one may be held liable for injuries 
resulting from it. 
Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
B. The Theory Of Unavoidable Accident Was Presented To The 
Jury. 
During both the empanelling and instruction of the jury, the 
trial court gave it several instructions which contained or were, 
in essence, instructions on the theory of unavoidable or inevitable 
accident. 
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The court, while empanelling the jury, made the following 
statement regarding the parties' theories of the case: 
This is an action for personal injury brought by the 
plaintiff, Anna Anderson, against Leonard Sharp, as a result 
of an automobile accident. Plaintiff claims that as she was 
traveling northbound on Interstate 15 near the point of the 
mountain the defendant negligently and carelessly drove his 
vehicle into the rear of her car, causing her injuries. 
The defendant, Mr. Sharp, alleges the accident was not 
the result of his negligence and it was due to the existing 
weather conditions and plaintiff's own negligence. 
(T. 9) (emphasis added). Although the word "unavoidable" was not 
included, it was implied in the emphasized language, and sets forth 
defendant's unavoidable accident theory. The trial court's 
presentation of this language to the jury could have done nothing 
else but convey to the jury the impression that this was a 
permissible theory of the case. 
Instruction No. 9, which the trial court presented to the jury 
after the presentation of the evidence stated, in part, that "[t]he 
mere fact that the events complained of occurred does not support 
an inference that any party to this action was negligent." The 
wording of this instruction also implies an unavoidable accident 
theory of non-liability. The wording of this instruction is 
substantially similar to the wording disapproved of by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Randle v. Allen, 223 U.A.R. at 6, less the express 
words, "unavoidable accident." 
Defendant's counsel made it clear throughout the trial that 
unavoidable accident was his theory of the case. He moved for a 
directed verdict on this basis, "contrary to what's been discussed 
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so far regarding the recent case of Randall [sic] versus Allen," 
(T. 203) , and excepted to the trial court's refusal to give his 
unavoidable accident instruction on the ground that he felt that 
Randle was wrongly decided. 
This theory was, not surprisingly, incorporated by defense 
counsel into his closing argument, which provided, in part, as 
follows: 
What else is the next instruction? And if you read all 
of that stuff — I'm not saying you need to read it all, but 
please, please for Mr. Sharp, read this sentence. "The mere 
fact that the event complained of occurred does not support an 
inference that any party to this accident was negligent." It 
doesn't. And that's all we have in this event, as you know is 
the fact that the accident occurred. . . . 
. . . Well he's traveling too fast for the conditions. 
That's what he did wrong. What happened when the conditions 
changed, when the snow plow threw it threw it [sic] or 
whatever? We know what the point is like. He didn't wait for 
the car to come out after there was a danger. He started to 
do what any of us would do. He started to slow down. As a 
matter of fact, he didn't want to get into that situation 
ahead of him so he did slow down. Then she comes out of the 
cloud because she's braking. The car is ahead of her. A 
situation that she — and I think what they're doing, both of 
them is relatively the same . . . so she's braking to avoid 
cars in front of her, just like he's braking not just to avoid 
cars, but on the off chance what happens is going to happen, 
the car comes out and he's already prepared and already 
braking and already slowing down but didn't get quite slowed 
enough and he bumps. What did he do wrong? If you read 
through the next instructions that tells you what he has to do 
. . . 15 states when a person without carelessness or 
fault is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril — 
and it goes on to say you're not held to the same standard. 
If you're in a situation like that that arose quickly because 
of the snow, you do the best you can. If you had created that 
situation, then we could pont the finger at them. Again, 
unlike other rear end accidents this is different and the real 
inference is, oh, he hit her from behind, it's [sic] his 
fault. And the truth is normally you are. You're in city 
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traffic, not leaving a proper following distance, any number 
of reasons. But this is a case not like other accidents. 
Where is that burden? How can I rebut other than to say, well 
it happened the way it happened . . . 
. . . She may have seen the accident coming — not that 
she saw him doing anything wrong, but she knew she was in a 
dangerous situation. Accidents like that happen all the time. 
(T. 224-25, 227-29, 230) 
Despite plaintiff's counsel's objections, the court instructed 
the jury and allowed defense counsel to present an unavoidable 
accident theory of the case. 
C. The Jury Was Confused By The Presentation Of The 
Unavoidable Accident Theory To Plaintiff's Prejudice. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Howard, objected specifically and at 
length to the jury instructions as a whole, and to many of the 
specific instructions, on the basis that they were redundant, 
duplicative, and overly and unfairly emphasized defendant's theory 
of the case. 
Unfair emphasis was considered in Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). The court stated: 
In Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 
422 (1968) , as well as several other cases, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that 
the more basic reason for criticizing such an 
[unavoidable accident] instruction is that it is a 
duplication. Inasmuch as the jury is elsewhere 
advised that the defendant's negligence must be 
proved, and that in the absence of such proof of 
negligence he is not liable, it is unnecessary to 
state again that if the accident was unavoidable 
because not caused by negligence, he is not liable. 
Ames, 846 P.2d at 72. The Randle court concurs: 
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Apart from the inherent confusion in an unavoidable 
accident instruction, the instruction tends to 
reemphasize the defendant's theory of the case, that the 
defendant was not negligent. To that extent, the 
instruction constitutes an inappropriate judicial comment 
on the evidence and could be viewed by the jury as a 
"you-should-find-for-the-defendant" type of instruction. 
Randle, 223 U.A.R. at 9. This is an additional reason why the 
court committed reversible error. The court, in essence, provided 
an improper reemphasis of defendant's theory of the case, thus 
serving to further confuse the jury. 
D. An Unavoidable Accident Instruction Is Particularly 
Confusing Where The Evidence Indicates One Or More Of The 
Parties May Have Been Negligent. 
The Randle court stated that an unavoidable accident 
instruction, while never acceptable, was even more confusing when 
given "when the evidence clearly establishes that one or more of 
the parties might be at fault." Randle, 223 U.A.R. at 10. The 
evidence in this case indicates that the plaintiff was travelling 
at a reasonable rate of speed for the conditions. There is no 
evidence, even from defendant's testimony, that plaintiff had 
stopped or slowed down immediately prior to the accident. His 
vision was then momentarily obscured, he braked as he observed he 
was overtaking plaintiff, and then slammed into her. Such evidence 
establishes at least a substantial possibility that one or both of 
the drivers might have been at fault, making an unavoidable 
accident instruction even more confusing to the jury and, 
consequently, even more impermissible. Further, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in Ames v. Maas, 846 P. 2d at 474, indicated that the 
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giving of an unavoidable accident instruction in a weather-related 
highway accident case was improper because "hazardous winter 
driving conditions in northern Utah are not unusual or unexpected." 
Id. at 474. This provides yet another reason why the trial court's 
instruction of the jury was erroneous. 
E. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Presenting 
The Unavoidable Accident Theory To The Jury. 
The Utah appellate courts "review a trial court's instructions 
under a correction of error standard." Ames, 846 P. 2d at 471. 
"The test upon review of an improper instruction is ^whether there 
is a probability that the jurors were misled and thereby reached a 
different result than they would have reached but for the error.'" 
Anknev v. Hall, 764 P.2d 153, 155 (Okl. 1988). There is no doubt, 
based upon the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in Randle, and 
the present facts, that there is a substantial probability that the 
jurors were misled and, thereby, reached a different result than 
they would have reached but for the error. Accordingly, plaintiff 
is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL TO PLAINTIFF. 
A. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Judgment NOV. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 50, a trial court should grant a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds 
that no competent evidence supports the verdict. King v. Fereday, 
739 P.2d 619, 628 (Utah 1987); accord Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 
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693, 695 (Utah 1982); Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown 
& Gunnell, Inc.. 784 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, 
such a judgment can be granted only when the losing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 
P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). MA motion for a directed verdict will not 
be sustained if the evidence allows reasonable persons to reach 
different conclusions on the issues in controversy." Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982). For 
such a motion to succeed, the moving party "must marshal all the 
evidence supporting the verdict" and then show that the evidence 
cannot support the verdict. Hansen, 761 P. 2d at 17. The appellate 
court must apply this same standard in reviewing a trial court's 
determination on this issue. King, 739 P.2d at 620. 
Plaintiff moved for judgment NOV on the grounds that there is 
a presumption that a defendant is negligent when, in the absence of 
the plaintiff's negligence, he or she rear-ends plaintiff's 
vehicle, and that the evidence presented by defendant failed to 
rebut this presumption. The evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to defendant, supports judgment for plaintiff. 
The rear-end collision doctrine is directly applicable to 
plaintiff's theory and the facts of this case. Plaintiff's theory 
of the case was, essentially, that she was rear-ended by defendant 
without any fault, whatsoever, on her part. 
Leonard Sharp's testimony, taken in the light most favorable 
to him, indicates that he observed Mrs. Anderson's vehicle and the 
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snow plow at some distance ahead of him, which he estimated to be 
between 150 feet to a mile. According to Mr. Sharp, Mr. Anderson's 
vehicle and the snowplow were adjacent to each other at the time he 
saw them. He did not observe Mrs. Anderson to ever pass the snow 
plow. Even though he did not have a specific estimate of how fast 
the snow plow or Mrs. Anderson were travelling, he observed that 
his speed of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour was faster than 
that of the snow plow and that of Mrs. Sharp, because he was 
gaining on them. In fact, he was becoming concerned enough about 
gaining on Mrs. Sharp that he had planned to change into the left 
lane to pass her after the car in the left lane passed him, just 
prior to the collision. Mr. Sharp also acknowledged that it was 
within his range of experience that snow plows occasionally hit 
snow and plow it, and that snow could fly. Both parties7 testimony 
indicates that it was windy and snow was blowing at the time. 
Even taking Mr. Sharp's testimony that he couldn't help 
hitting Mrs. Anderson's vehicle because it was temporarily obscured 
by blowing snow from the snow plow as true, Mr. Sharp has not 
provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence 
Mrs. Anderson was entitled to under the circumstances. 
To rebut a presumption of negligence under the rear-end 
presumption doctrine dicussed in Section I of this Brief, the 
defendant must show that the leading driver was negligent or that 
there was otherwise no reason to anticipate the driver's conduct. 
Hahn, 611 P. 2d at 67-68. Nothing in Mr. Sharp's testimony could be 
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construed to show that Mrs. Anderson was negligent. Mr. Sharp's 
testimony did not establish that Mrs. Anderson was stopped in the 
middle of the freeway. Even if Mrs. Anderson had been travelling 
at a substantially slower rate of speed than Mr. Sharp, as his 
testimony suggests, Mr. Sharp, himself, was well aware of that fact 
according to his testimony and, further, also slowed down 
substantially himself, as soon as it became obvious that his speed 
was too fast for the conditions. Mr. Sharp, therefore, has failed 
to bring forth any evidence that Mrs. Anderson was negligent, or 
that he was doing anything other than failing to travel at a speed 
reasonable under the conditions. Mr. Sharp, accordingly, failed to 
rebut the presumption to which plaintiff is entitled, and, 
accordingly, cannot prevail as a matter of law. The trial court, 
therefore, committed reversible error in denying plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment NOV. 
B. Alternatively, Plaintiff Is Entitled To A New Trial, 
"A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial 
will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." 
Knight v. Ebert, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). n[T]he 
trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial unless the 
moving party shows at least one of the circumstances specified in 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.11 Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Crookston 
v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 802-03 (Utah 1991). Rule 
59(a), in relevant part, states: 
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(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings 
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(7) Error in law. 
It has been observed that the standard to be applied by the 
trial court in determining to grant a motion for judgment NOV is 
stricter than the standard for deciding to grant a new trial. "A 
j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. On the other hand, a new trial may 
be granted whenever there is evidence that would have permitted 
entry of a judgment for a losing party." Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17. 
After entry of the judgemnt in defendant's favor, plaintiff 
moved, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59(a). The trial 
court denied plaintiff's Motion. 
The grounds upon which plaintiff asserted that a new trial 
should be granted fall under subsections (1) and (7) of the Rule, 
and include the following: 
11
 (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." 
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Plaintiff alleged before the trial court, and has set forth 
arguments in this brief, that the trial court erred by (a) failing 
to instruct the jury as to plaintiff's rear-end collision 
presumption theory of the case, when plaintiff had presented 
sufficient evidence to be entitled to such an instruction, and (b) 
giving unbalanced and unnecessary instructions, which had the 
effect of confusing and misleading the jury. These errors 
constitute irregularities in the proceeding of the court, improper 
orders of the court, and abuses of discretion on the part of the 
court. They justify the granting of a new trial. 
"(7) Error in law." The trial court failed to properly 
instruct the jury as to plaintiff's rear-end negligence theory of 
the case on the erroneous grounds that such instruction was 
contrary to Utah law, and improperly allowed the jury to consider 
an unavoidable accident theory in violation of Randle v. Allen, 223 
U.A.R. at 6, thereby misleading the jury as to the law and 
entitling plaintiff to a new trial. 
Should this Court find that any one of these allegations of 
error constitute reversible error, it should also find that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial, and reverse and remand for a new trial. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO HAVE 
COSTS TAXED BY THE COURT. 
A. Taxing of Deposition Costs Is An Exception To Rule 54(d). 
This issue revolves around the interpretation and scope of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), the basic statutory provision regarding the 
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taxing of costs, with respect to the taxing of deposition costs. 
Rule 54(d), in relevant part, states: 
Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; . . . . 
The Utah courts have generally interpreted Rule 54(d) very 
narrowly in determining what costs are allowable under its 
provisions. The leading case on this issue is Frampton v. Wilson, 
605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), in which the Utah Supreme Court limited 
costs for witness fees and subpoenas to only the amount allowed by 
statute, and then refused to allow the cost of any litigation 
expenses, including models and expert witness fees, because they 
were not ennumerated in any statute or rule, and, so, were 
precluded by the express wording of the statute. .Id. at 774. The 
court stated, "the generally accepted rule is that it (Rule 54(d)) 
means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to 
witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included in 
the judgment." Id. The court thus distinguished between "the 
legitimate and taxable xcosts' and other * expenses,' of litigation 
which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as 
costs." Id. 
Nevertheless, the Frampton court made an exception to the rule 
and allowed the costs of depositions under certain circumstances. 
Deposition costs were allowed "subject to the limitation that the 
trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good faith and, in 
light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the 
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development and presentation of the case." IcL Deposition costs 
must "relate to the examination of witnesses whose testimony is 
deemed essential to the trial, and taken for potential use as 
testimony at trial." Jd. Deposition costs have been found to be 
necessary and reasonable "where the development of the case is of 
such a complex nature that discovery cannot be accomplished through 
the less expensive method of interrogatories, requests for 
admissions and requests for the production of documents," or where 
the depositions were actually used in court." Highland 
Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 683 P.2d 1043, 1051 
(Utah 1984) . That this is an exception to the otherwise clear 
language of the rule is shown by the strict limitation put on it by 
Frampton: The taxing of depositions "was not intended and should 
not be taken as opening the door to other expenses of the character 
here claimed by the plaintiff as costs." Frampton, 605 P. 2d at 
774. 
The Utah appellate courts have allowed the taxing of costs in 
several cases. For example, in Lawson Supply Co. v. General 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. . 27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1972) , costs were allowed for three depositions, two of the 
defendants and one of the general contractor involved, on the basis 
that one of the facts discovered in the depositions was important 
in the development of the case. Id. at 610. Two of the 
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depositions were not used in court, and the third was used 
unnecessarily7 while the witness was in court. Id. at 611, 
(Henriod, J. , dissenting). Likewise, in Highland Construction Co., 
683 P. 2d at 1042, the court found that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding deposition costs because 
[t]he complexity of a construction case and the theories 
of recovery sought to be used here made it virtually 
impossible to obtain sufficient information for the 
preparation of the case through more conservative methods 
of discovery. Moreover, the depositions were used at 
trial on cross-examination, both to impeach veracity and 
to refresh memory. 
Id. at 1051-52. 
On the other hand, the Utah courts have not taxed the costs of 
depositions in several cases, although the factual situations are 
not substantially different from those cases in which it taxed the 
cost of depositions. For example, in Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 
163, 290 P.2d 245 (1955), the cost bill at issue included three 
depositions of witnesses who appeared at trial, two of whom were 
the plaintiff's witnesses and one of whom was the defendant. The 
Utah Supreme Court disallowed these costs, stating that "[n]othing 
is made to appear in the instant case to justify the inclusion of 
the depositions above referred to in the costs awarded to the 
plaintiffs." Id. at 247. Similarly, in Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 
601 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court 
erred in awarding costs of taking depositions. The court stated 
7
 In Justice Henriod's opinion, as reflected in his dissent in Lawson Supply Co. v. General 
Plumbing and Heating. 493 P.2d at 611. 
41 
that "the critical consideration is that the depositions were not 
used by defendant during the course of the trial, and he presented 
no evidence that the costs of these depositions were necessarily 
incurred for the preparation of defendant's case." Xd. at 604. In 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) , deposition costs were not allowed, even 
though the claiming party argued that both parties anticipated one 
of the witnesses would be unavailable to testify at trial, and 
portions of another witness's deposition were used at trial. Id. 
at 512. 
B. The Deposition Cost Exception To Rule 54(d) Should Be 
Abandoned By This Court. 
Taxing deposition costs is not explicitly provided for in the 
Utah statutes, thereby making the award of such costs an exception 
to the otherwise strictly construed Rule 54(d). There are a number 
of compelling reasons why this exception should be abandoned by 
this Court: 
1. The exception does violence to the express wording of the 
Rule. Rule 54(d) expressly disallows the taxing of costs against 
procedural rules. Deposition costs are not addressed in any Utah 
statute or procedural rule. This Court has allowed no other 
exceptions to this rule, even though there are many other necessary 
costs of litigation. Under rules of statutory interpretation, it 
is improper to include anything that is expressly excluded. Doing 
such amounts to judicial legislation, which is strictly prohibited 
by the separation of powers provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions. 
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Justice Henriod, in his dissent to Lawson Supply Co, v. 
General Plumbing and Heating, 493 P. 2d at 610, recognized this 
problem, stating, "[This issue] is a product of none of this 
court's business, amounts to judicial legislation, and is bottomed 
on no legitimate authority save our own ipse dixit." Id. at 610 
(Henriod, J., dissenting). He further noted that 
There is absolutely nothing in our statutes having to do 
with depositions being assessable as costs. There was 
nothign there before the rules were promulgated and it 
seems clear from Rule 54(d) and the compiler's notes that 
no change was intended to include depositions as costs 
where they did not exist before. 
Id. at 610. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), followed 
similar reasoning in holding that expert witness fees in a 
condemnation action were not reimburseable costs under the relevant 
statutes, including Rule 54(d), even though such costs were clearly 
necessary to defend the condemnation action and substantially 
diminished the value of the condemnee's judgment. The Daskalas 
court cited with approval Department of Transp. v. Winston 
Container Co., 263 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1980), which stated, 
"compensation for such costs incurred by a landowner in a 
condemnation action is a matter of legislative prerogative and must 
be provided for by statute." Id. at 1123 (emphasis added). The 
Daskalas court concluded, "If an adjustment in the law of eminent 
domain is dictated by fairness in this connection, it is a matter 
for consideration and action by the [legislature]. Id. at 1124. 
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2. The standards set forth in Frampton for determining which 
depositions should be taxed are unworkable. 
The outcomes of similar cases are inconsistent. Notably, 
although the depositions were not used at trial in Lawson, Nelson, 
and Lloyd's Unlimited, deposition costs were taxed in Lawson. but 
were disallowed in Nelson and Lloyd/d Unlimited. In Lloyd's 
Unlimited, 753 P. 2d at 512, the court disallowed the cost of 
depositions, even though the plaintiff had claimed that they had 
been essential for the development and presentation of the case. 
In contrast, the court upheld an award of deposition costs where 
the case and the theories of recovery were of a complex nature, and 
the depositions were used at trial." Highland Construction Co., 
683 P.2d at 1051-52. Thus, there is substantial inconsistency in 
the application of the Frampton standard to actual cases. 
Further, it is impossible to tell in advance of taking a 
deposition, or even after the taking of the deposition but prior to 
the court's ruling, whether the costs of a deposition may be 
taxable. This is because it is impossible to the trial court's 
determination of ultimate necessity of a deposition before the 
contents of the deposition are known and the court has ruled. In 
other words, the Frampton standards are arbitrary, making the 
exception untenable. 
3. The exception is inconsistent with the rule that other 
necessary costs of litigation are disallowed. As Frampton notes, 
there are many expenses of litigation which are "ever so 
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necessary," but are not taxed. Frampton, 605 P. 2d at 774. Justice 
Henriod notes that 
[t]he argument that depositions should be taxed as costs 
because necessary to prepare one's case, equally would be 
appliable to expenses in hiring a private eye, taking a 
trip to Acapulco to interview a witness, or the cost in 
salary of the time consumed by a lovely Flossie Fosham 
while taking dictation from her Simon Legree employer. 
Fact is, most all cases can be developed on both sides by 
use of interrogatories, requests for admissions, pretrial 
conferences and the other discovery processes. 
Lawson Supply Co., 493 P.2d at 611 (Henriod, J., dissenting). 
4. The exception is not conducive to judicial economy. 
Without a clearly articulated or easily applicable standard of what 
depositions are or are not allowed, this issue will continue to 
arise in trial after trial, and appeal after appeal. These issues 
are time consuming, irritating and onerous. To handle each case 
consistently and fairly, each deposition should be examined, along 
with any interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for 
production of documents, in the context of the case as it actually 
developed, to determine, after the fact, if the deposition was 
really necessary and if the information could actually have been 
obtained by less expensive means. Such review by both the trial 
court and the appellate court is expensive, as is the cost to the 
parties of the attorneys' time spent in arguments on such issues. 
This exception can do nothing more than generate substantial 
expenses in case after case which, in all probability, will be 
higher than the costs of the depositions sought to be taxed. This 
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is a waste of judicial time and resources as well as that of the 
parties. 
5. This exception results in fundamental unfairness. 
Justice Henriod accurately points out that 
ft]he litigant with means effectively can force an unfair 
settlement with the deposition, if it can be taxed as 
costs. It can be an implement of imbalance, like 
weighing a baseball bat on one plate of the scales of 
justice against a toothpick on the other. The mere 
threat of taking depositions, if they could be taxed as 
costs, would lead a poor litigant to an undeserved, 
unfair, and unconscionable settlement and to the 
bankruptcy court if he happened to lose, and it is 
pretty difficult these days to buy sure-win insurance. 
Lawson Supply Co., 493 P.2d at 611 (Henriod, J., dissenting). 
This reasoning has been recognized by the majority of the Utah 
Supreme Court. In Highland Construction Co. , 683 P. 2d at 1051, 
this court stated, "The award of costs should be narrowly made to 
guard against abuse by those better financially equipped lest costs 
of seeking justice become prohibitive for the financially ill 
equipped." .Id. at 1051. 
For these reasons, this Court should abolish the depositon 
exception to the disallowance of nonstatutory costs under Rule 
54(d). It should, consistent with this finding, also reverse the 
trial court's award of costs against plaintiff in this action. 
C. In The Alternative, Defendant Has Failed To Justify Any 
Award Of Costs Under Rule 54(d). 
In the event that this Court should continue to uphold the 
deposition costs exception to Rule 54(d), defendant has not carried 
his burden of proof sufficiently to justify an award of costs. 
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As discussed above, to justify an award of deposition costs, 
the nature of the case must be so complex that other means of 
discovery are ineffective, the depositions are otherwise necessary 
to the factual development of the case, or the depositions were 
taken for use in court. M[T]he party seeking the cost of 
depositions bears the burden of proving that the depositions were 
reasonably necessary." Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d at 686; accord 
Highland Construction Co., 683 P.2d at 1051. 
Defendant is demanding compensation for seven depositions in 
his Bill of Costs, not four as stated in his Memorandum. The case 
is a simple negligence case with no complex theories of liability. 
Defendant did not call as witnesses Michael Sabey, Greg DuVal, or 
David Beaufort, yet demands deposition costs for all of them. 
Further, defendant has not brought forth evidence, aside from his 
conclusory allegations in his Bill of Costs, that deposition of any 
of these parties was necessary, particularly those of Michael 
Sabey, Greg DuVal, and David Beaufort, who were not called as 
witnesses by defendant. Defendant has totally neglected to argue 
or show that any of these depositions were required because less 
expensive means of discovery were inadequate. Conclusory 
statements, such as that put forth by defendant in his Memorandum 
of Costs, are not sufficient. See Birch Creek Irrigation v. 
Prothero, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (1993) .8 This proposition is 
8
 Although Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 deals with the issuance 
of a temporary restraining order, the principle it is cited for, that supporting detail is necessary to 
support a finding, is applicable to the present circumstance. 
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supported by the Utah Court of Appeals in Morgan, 795 P.2d at 684. 
The Morgan court stated: 
Vera argues that the two depositions, for which she 
seeks costs, were necessary "in order to verify that the 
information obtained [from Wallace] was correct." In our 
review of the record, we cannot determine if the trial 
judge concluded that the deposition fees were reasonably 
necessary. In the findings and conclusions and decree, 
the deposition costs were simply awarded as part of the 
overall attorney fees, without consideration of their 
necessity. We therefore remand this issue to the trial 
court to determine if the deposition costs were 
reasonably necessary. 
Id. at 687. Because there was insufficient detail as to the 
necessity of the costs of the depositions requested by defendant in 
Morgan, the trial court's order awarding costs was overruled and 
remanded. Because defendant in the present case has failed to 
address and carry his burden of proof, the present trial court 
abused its discretion in making this award of costs to defendant. 
This Court should, therefore, reverse the trial court's award of 
costs in this matter. 
D. The Transcript From The Prior Trial Was Not A Reasonable 
Expense Under The Rule. 
Defendant ordered the transcript from the previous trial 
before any agreement was made to substitute the transcript for the 
testimony of the witness. Had each witness been called, all of 
whom were plaintiff's witnesses, the defendant could not have been 
awarded the cost of the transcript. 
Although transcripts may, on occasion, be taxable as costs 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-8 (1993), defendant has not justified 
the necessity of the transcript in view of his prior deposition of 
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many of the witnesses, thereby making the transcript redundant 
information and, accordingly, non-essential to the preparation of 
the case. The use to which defendant intended to put the 
transcript, prior to the parties' stipulation, is comparable in 
nature to the "other expenses" of litigation which the court found 
to be not properly taxable as costs. Accordingly, this Court 
should deny defendant's request for reimbursement of the costs of 
transcribing the transcript, and reverse the trial court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
trial court's verdict finding defendant not negligent and the trial 
court's order taxing costs against plaintiff. Plaintiff also 
requests a new trial on the issues of liability and damages, and an 
award of costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing this appeal. 
DATED this day of September, 1994. 
JACKSON HOWARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for a directed verdict; when made; effect. A 
party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence 
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the 
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do 
and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver 
of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved 
for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state 
the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting 
a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of 
the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all 
the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court 
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a 
later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. 
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any 
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a directed 
verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury 
has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be 
joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the 
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new 
trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct 
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed 
or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is 
granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new 
trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if 
the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall 
specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a 
new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus 
conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the 
finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial 
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has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court 
has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert 
error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the 
order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days 
after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on 
that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a 
new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the trial 
court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in 
this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to 
determine whether a new trial shall be granted. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objectons. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that 
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or 
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be 
given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be 
made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to 
give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make 
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the 
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the evidence, 
ii 
it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
• • • 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs 
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements 
have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. 
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven 
days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion 
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, 
or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the 
entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served 
and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to all the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury 
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
iii 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to 
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made under Subdivision (a) (1) , (2) , (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by an affidavit. Whenever motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended 
for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court 
for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new 
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
iv 
Utah Code Annotated 1993 
§ 78-56-8. Transcripts — Impecunious defendant in criminal case -
- Transcript from electronic recordings. 
(1) (a) When a transcript has been ordered by the court, the fees 
for transcribing shall be paid by the respective parties to 
the action or proceeding in equal proportion, or in 
proportions as the court orders. A transcript may not be 
taxed as costs, unless the preparation of the transcript is 
ordered either by a party or by the court. The reporter is 
not required in any case to transcribe notes until the fees 
for this are tendered, or a sufficient amount to cover the fee 
is deposited in court. 
(b) If the court determines that the defendant in a 
criminal case is impecunious, the court shall order the 
certified shorthand reporter to transcribe the notes requested 
by the defendant. The cost of the transcribing shall be paid 
under Section 77-56-5. 
(2) Transcripts from electronic recordings produced by a 
certified court transcriber are governed under this section, and 
compensation is at the same rates as under Section 78-56-4. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA ANDERSON, 
vs. 
LEONARD SHARP, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 890401053 
DATE: November 4, 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the questions submitted to us as 
follows: 
1. At the time and place of the incident in question and under the circumstances as 
shown by the evidence, was the Defendant, Leonard Sharp, negligent? 
Yes No V 
If you marked "No" as the answer to Question 1 go no further. Date and sign the form and 
return it to the Court. If you marked "Yes" proceed. 
2. Was the negligence of the Defendant, Leonard Sharp, a proximate cause of the 
incident? 
Yes No 
If you marked "No" as the answer to Question 2 go no further. Date and sign this form and 
return it to the Court. If you marked "Yes", proceed. 
3. At the time and place of the incident in question and under the circumstances as 
shown by the evidence, was the Plaintiff, Anna Anderson, negligent? 
Yes No 
4. Only if you marked "Yes" as the answer to Question, answer this question. Was 
the negligence of the Plaintiff, Anna Anderson, a proximate cause of the incident? 
Yes No 
Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 3 and 4, answer Question 5. If you marked "No" 
to either Question 3 or 4, skip to Question 6. 
5. Considering all the fault which caused the incident at 100%, what percentage of 
that fault was attributable to: 
A. The Defendant, Leonard Sharp % 
B. The Plaintiff, Anna Anderson % 
Total 100 % 
If Plaintiffs percentage of negligence is 50% or more do not answer the following question. 
Date and sign the form and return it to the Court. If the Plaintiffs percentage is less than 
50%, proceed. 
6. What sum would fairly compensate Plaintiff, for the damages, if any which she 
sustained as a result of the incident? 
A. For special damages $ 
B. For general damages $ 
Total $ 
DATED AND SIGNED this H day of November 1993. 
FOREPERSONS (/ 
4™ L'!S""-iUT COURT 
S T ' T - 3FUTAH 
HOY f ' 4'uu PH '93 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221 
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorney for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ANNA ANDERSON, 
vs. 
LEONARD SHARP, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
^ <y£r-V£'^3 
Civil No. CV-8^=0*&i53 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above-entitled matter was tried before a jury on 
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of November, 1993. The parties were present 
and represented by counsel, Jackson B. Howard, HOWARD, LEWIS & 
PETERSEN, for plaintiff, and Jeffery C. Peatross, IVIE & YOUNG, 
for the defendant. Testimony was given, evidence introduced, and 
arguments of counsel heard. 
After retiring, the jury returned the following answers 
to questions submitted on Special Verdict: 
1. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the 
defendant Leonard Sharp negligent? 
Yes No XXX 
The jury having marked question number one no, did not 
respond to the remaining Special Verdict questions. 
The verdict was then dated and signed the 4th day of 
November, 1993 by Mr. Norman L. Jones, foreperson. 
Based upon the answers to the questions of the special 
verdict, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Defendant is hereby awarded judgment against the 
plaintiff, no cause for action, together with costs of Court to 
be assessed hereafter in the amount of $ ^ .' CT> 1 ^  , pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54. u 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Judgment on Special Verdict with postage prepaid 
thereon this day of November, 1993, to the following: 
Jackson B. Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Qrt/yul ^&ahjfA/uyU 
£gcretary 
SF618J27 
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JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221 
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEONARD SHARP, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND DISBURSEMENTS 
Civxl NO. ~CV-0Q 040153-
Judge Ray M. Harding 
CLERK'S FEES: 
date to whom paid 
06-18-89 Utah County Clerk 
WITNESS FEES: 
place of 
name of witness residence 
for 
Jury Fee 
mileage 
fee 
$50.00 
fee 
Michael Sabey* 
Officer Michael Towers* 
Sue Pratley* 
Mary Staub* 
Charlotte Flores* 
Charlotte Flores 
Sue Pratley 
Mary Staub 
Alpine 
Am. Fork 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
15 miles 
10 miles 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
$ 20.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
WITNESS FEES: (cont'd) 
name of witness 
place of 
residence mileage fee 
Officer Michael Towers 
Brent Pratley, M.D. 
UVRMC 
UVRMC 
Brent Pratley, M.D. 
Charles Smith, M.D. 
* Fir* trial in August, 1992. 
Am. Fork 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
10 miles 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
1 mile 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
14.00 
14.00 
14.00 
SERVICE FEES: 
process server 
person 
served 
paper 
served 
place of 
service fee 
UT. Cnty. Sheriff 
Willis L. Vincent 
UT. Cnty. Constable 
Willis L. Vincent 
Dave Carter, Cnstble 
Dave Carter, Cnstble 
Dave Carter, Cnstble 
Dave Carter, Cnstble 
UT. Cnty. Constable 
Ut. Cnty. Constable 
Michael Sabey Subpoena 
Officer Tower 
C. Flores 
Pratley/Staub 
M. Staub 
C. Flores 
Officer Tower 
S. Pratley 
B. Pratley 
UVRMC 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Subpoena 
Alpine 
Am. Fork 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Provo 
Am. Fork 
Provo, 
Provo 
Provo 
$ 18.75 
48.00 
9.00 
24.00 
9.00 
9.00 
21.00 
9.00 
12.00 
12.00 
DEPOSITIONSJ 
date deponent 
court 
reporter fee 
05-02-91 
05-02-91 
04-04-91 
10-21-91 
11-25-91 
11-25-91 
07-06-92 
Leonard Sharp 
Anna Anderson 
Michael Sabey 
Greg DuVal 
Leonard Sharp 
Anna Anderson 
David Beaufort 
Lesley S. Nelson, C.S.R. $107.45 
Lesley S. Nelson, C.S.R. 107.45 
Myron A. Frazier, C.S.R. 147.00 
Assoc. Prof. Reporters 39.40 
Assoc. Prof. Reporters 39.40 
Assoc. Prof. Reporters 233.70 
Assoc. Prof. Reporters 97.02 
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TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS: 
date 
08-92 
witness 
Vol. I-III 
court 
reporter 
Creed Barker 
TOTAL $2, 
fee 
925.00 
,100.17 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
County of Utah ) 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, being duly sworn, says that he is 
the attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled action, and 
as such, is better informed relative to the above costs and 
disbursements than the said defendant. That the items contained 
in the Memorandum are correct to best of the affiant's knowledge 
and belief, and that the said disbursements have been necessarily 
incurred in said action. 
FERy< 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this u2* day of 
November, 1993. 
NOTARY *Vtil iC 
JAMS£L. MAYWA*; 
° 'jvo, >Jt'^ 3"- ' 
M,'Conm$s»o» »-'• M NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, with 
postage prepaid thereon, this 10** day of November, 1993, to: 
Jackson B. Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
SF61&-1J27 
ecretar; 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT V 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA ANDERSON, 
vs. 
LEONARD D. SHARP, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 89040153 
DATE: December 2, 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff's motions for Judgement 
NOV or in the Alternative a New Trial, and to Tax Costs by the Court. Having received 
and considered Plaintiff's Motions, together with memoranda both in support and in 
opposition to the motions, the Court hereby denies the motions. 
The Plaintiff first asks for Judgement NOV because the Court gave a jury instruction 
on the "unavoidable accident". A closer reading of the jury instructions reveals that this 
instruction was scheduled to be given in the first trial that ended in a mistrial. As discussed 
with counsel, the Court recognized this instruction is now inappropriate and it was never 
given to the jury in this case. Plaintiffs argument without foundation. 
Plaintiff further argues that Court erred by not allowing her counsel to conduct voir 
dire or supplement voir dire with reasonable questions. The Court allowed each counsel to 
submit proposed voir dire questions in advance of trial From these the court selected those 
it deemed "material and proper". In addition, at the conclusion of the Courts questioning, 
each counsel was allowed to ask additional questions, which the plaintiffs counsel did. Voir 
dire was conducted appropriately and in accordance with the statute. 
Plaintiff finally argues that as a matter of law the Defendant should be presumed 
negligent in rear-end collisions. This is not the law in Utah and the facts do not support 
such a presumption in this case. 
The Court finds the costs as submitted by the Defendant to be reasonable and 
necessary and sets the amount at $2100.17. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 2>(0 day of December, 1993. 
cc: Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. 
ii 
Fourth !«*•: ^ =rr«ct Court 
ofUtar•• Scumv **eofUtah 
CARM* a. SMITH, CJ$J*<—N 
/n-$~f>£ \S^ Deputy 
WCaOFlMED, 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221 
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
a . i4 /jte 
ANNA ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEONARD D. SHARP, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
A>63 
Civil No. 890404*6— 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The court having considered the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment NOV or in the Alternative a New Trial and Plaintiff's 
Motion to Tax Defendant's Cost Bill, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and 
DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Judgment NOV or in the Alternative a 
New Trial is hereby denied for the reasons set forth in the 
court's memorandum decision dated December 2, 1993 . 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Defendant's Cost Bill is 
also denied. The court finds defendant's cost bill to be 
reasonable and necessary and awards costs in the amount of 
$2,100.17. Such costs are to be included in the space in 
i^ *J ** 
plaintiff's judgment, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DATED AND SIGNED this *P day of December, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
JACKSON HOWARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
' 07 S* .-'^  .*' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
* > ' / 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order with postage prepaid thereon this 
day of December, 1993, to the following: 
Jackson B. Howard 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
S e c r e t a r y ^ 
SF618J28 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy 
ANNA L ANDERSON 
vs. 
LEONARD SHARP 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
JURY TRIAL 
CASE NO. 890401053 
DATE: November 2, 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M HARDING 
REPT. BY: Creed Barker, CSR 
CLERK: LLP, LCW, AAD 
This matter came before the Court for jury trial in the above-entitled matter. 
Jackson Howard appeared representing the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was present. Jeff 
Peatross appeared representing the Defendant. The Defendant was present. 
The jurors were sworn and qualified. Jurors Gregory John Waterhouse, Roselyn 
Luke, and Merlin Dee Allen were excused by the Court. 
The jurors were ten called, seated, and sworn and questioned as follows: 
Phoebe B Thomas, Stephanie N Chischillie, Alice L Beck, Arthur D Cox, Vonda 
Packer Bahr, Ralph Kent Gygi, Margaret Cope Daley, Pamela Captain Haws, 
Garlen Lyle Johnson, Norman L Jones, Matthew S Shaw, Julie R Wilkinson, 
Sherie J Cole, Kent T Purdy, Treg Sheldon Anderson, Ty Kenneth Briggs, 
Paula Harrington Lifferth, Thais C Degrey, Nancy G Perl, Barbara Lynn May, 
Ina D Davis, Glenna B Hansen, Jennifer Johnson, Kearney, Kristy Kaye Bushnell, 
Kevin D Coleman, June M Larson, Berva Dawn Griffin. 
Mr. Howard addressed further questions to the jurors. Mr. Peatross addressed 
further questions to the jurors. 
The jury was given the cautionary admonition and court recessed at 11:35 a.m. 
Court held in chambers conference with jurors Ralph Kent Gygi and Ty Kenneth 
Briggs. 
Jurors Phoebe B Thomas and Ralph Kent Gygi were excused for cause. 
Court resumed session at 11:56 a.m. with the jury panel seated and all parties ready 
to proceed. 
Counsel passed the jury for cause. 
Peremptory challenges were taken. 
The following jurors were called to serve as jurors in this cse, sworn, and seated as 
follows: 
Stephanie N Chischillie, Arthur D Cox, Margaret Cope Daley, Garten Lyle 
Johnson, Norman L Jones, Julie R Wilkinson, Sherie J Cole, Treg Sheldon 
Anderson. 
Court then thanked and excused the jurors not chosen for this case. 
Court recessed for lunch at 12:15 p.m. 
Court resumed session at 1:25 p.m. with the jury seated and all parties ready to 
proceed. 
Court held a conference at the bench with counsel. 
Mr. Jackson presented opening statements to the jury. 
Mr. Peatross presented opening statement to the jury. 
Plaintiff was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Howard. Plaintiffs exhibit 
number 42 (summary of medical expenses) was offered and received. 
Cross by Mr. Peatross. 
The jury was given the cautionary admonition and court recessed at 3:08 p.m. 
Court resumed session at 3:31 p.m. with the jury seated and all parties ready to 
proceed. 
A stipulation was entered for the receipt of the Plaintiffs exhibits listed below. 
Plaintiff s exhibits 1,2,4,5,6,9, 10,11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 
41 were offered and received. 
Continued cross of Plaintiff by Mr. Peatross. Defendant's exhibit #43 (Plaintiffs 
affidavit) was offered and received. Defendant's exhibit #44 (Driver's statement) was 
offered and received. Defendant's exhibit #45 and #46 (photos) were offered and received. 
Defendant's exhibit #47 (radiologist report) was offered and received. 
Redirect by Mr. Howard. Plaintiffs exhibit #48 and was offered and received. 
Plaintiffs exhibits number 32 through 35 were offered. 
Mr. Peatross voir dired. 
Plaintiffs exhibits number 32 through 35 were received. 
Redirect continued. 
Recross by Peatross. 
Court gave the jury the cautionary admonition and recessed at 4:55 p.m. Court 
will resume session at 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 1993. 
November 4, 1993, 10:30 a.m. 
Court resumed with the jury, counsel, and parties present and ready to proceed. 
Jury instructions were read. 
Closing statements were made to the jury by Mr. Jackson. 
Closing statements were made to the jury by Mr. Petross. 
Rebuttal presented by Mr. Howard. 
November 3, 1993 
Counsel met in chambers with the Court. Exhibit 49 marked. 
Court reconvened with the jury seated and all parties ready to proceed. 
Andrew Howard took the stand to assist in the reading of the transcript from the 
previous hearing. The jury was excused so the counsel could address the Court regarding a 
matter of law. The Court will permit the reading of the transcript of cross examination and 
will not receive Exhibit #3. Mr. Howard made his objections for the record. 
The jury was present and seated. Reading of the transcript continued. 
Court gave the jury the cautionary admonition and recessed for lunch until 1:00 
.
%
 * i 
p.m. 
The Court reconvened at 1:10 p.m. with the jury seated and all parties ready to 
proceed. 
The reading of the transcript continued. Discussion between the Court and counsel 
regarding exhibit #7. The Court will allow the oversized exhibit #7 to be shown to the jury. 
Exhibits #7 and #8 received. The Court will permit Exhibit #22 and #3 received into 
evidence. 
The Court gave the jury the cautionary admonistion and recessed for 10 minutes. 
The court reconvened with at 3:25 with the jury seated and the parties ready to 
proceed. 
Mr. Howard preferred testimon of the plaintiff. 
Roger Anderson sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Howard. Cross examination 
by Mr. Peatross. Mr. Howard objected to the form of questioning. Objection sustained. 
Anna Anderson recalled as a witness by Mr. Howard. The Court reminded Ms. 
Anderson she was still under oath. Witness questioned by Mr. Peatross. Plaintiff rests. 
Leonard Sharp sworn and testified on direct examination by Mr. Peatross. Cross 
by Mr. Howard. 
Glenda Sharp sworn and testified on direct examination by Mr. Peatross. Exhibit 
49 offered. Cross examination by Mr. Howard. Mr. Howard objects to exhibit 49. The 
Court will allow Exhibit 49 to be admitted. 
The Court gave the jury the cautionary admonition and recessed at 4:35 p.m. The 
Court will reconvene on November 4, 1993 at 10:00 a.m. 
Mr. Peatross addressed the Court after the jury had exited the courtroom and 
moved to dismiss the case. Mr. Howard responded. Court will take the motion under 
advisement. The Court gave copies of the instructions to counsel to review 
November 4, 1993 
Court resumed with the jury, counsel, and parties ready to proceed. 
The Court read the jury instructions. 
Mr. Howard presented closing arguments to the jury. 
Mr. Peatross presented his closing arguments to the jury. 
The Court recessed the Jury to enter into deliberation. 
Mr. Howard made an amended motion for directed verdict on the basis of prime 
facie evidence. 
The Court took the motion under advisement. 
Court recessed. 
Court resumed with the jury, counsel and parties present and ready to proceed. 
The jury returned with a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
The jury was polled. 
Mr. Peatross is to prepare judgment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
what, if any, negligent conduct the defendant committed, and that such negligence, if any, was 
a proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence what damages, if any she has sustained as a result 
of the defendant's negligent conduct, if any. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds, 
seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of 
the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but 
by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you, 
the jury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
The law does not permit you to base a verdict on speculation or conjecture as to the 
facts. If the evidence does not preponderate in favor of the party making the claim or assertion, 
then that party has failed to meet the burden of proof and your finding must be against that party 
on that issue. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests upon a certain 
party, I mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, you shall find that the same is not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its 
convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice or passion 
for or against either party to the action. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Insofar as you are concerned, you may consider as evidence whatever is admitted in the 
trial as part of the record, whether it be the testimony of witnesses or an article or document 
marked as an exhibit, or other matter admitted, such as an admission, agreement, or stipulation. 
At times I have ruled upon objections to the admission of certain things into evidence. 
Questions relating to admissibility of evidence are solely questions of law and you must not 
concern yourself with my reasons for ruling as I have, or draw any inferences therefrom in favor 
of or against either party. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the Court does-
not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of 
the witness. As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture 
as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
Statements, arguments, and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in understanding 
the evidence and in applying the law, but they are not evidence. You should disregard any such 
utterance that has no basis in the evidence, unless such statement was made as an admission or 
stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts. 
If the Court has said or done anything which has suggested to you that it is inclined to 
favor the claims or positions of either party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by 
any such suggestion. Neither in these instructions nor in any ruling, action, or remark that I 
have made during the course of this trial have I intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion 
as to how I would resolve any of the factual issues of this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent and 
that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. The mere fact that the 
event complained of occurred does not support an inference that any party to this action was 
negligent. 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in the natural and continuous 
sequences, produces the injury, and without which the results would not have occurred. It is 
the efficient cause — the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the -
injury. It may operate directly or through intermediate agencies or through conditions created 
by such agencies. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate cause of damages incurred. 
The acts and omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of 
any damages and in such case, each of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as 
a proximate cause. 
If you find that a party to this action was negligent, that party will not be liable unless 
you also find that its negligence was the proximate cause of the damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done 
under the circumstances, or doing what such a person under such circumstances would not have 
done. The fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act. 
The person whose conduct we set up as a standard is not the extraordinary cautious 
individual, nor the exceptionally skillftil one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence, 
While exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand 
them as a general standard of conduct. 
J^J 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, writings, material objects, or anything 
presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact. 
Evidence is either direct or circumstantial. 
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact, without the necessity of an 
inference, and which by itself, if found to be true, establishes that fact. 
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which 
an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. And it is a deduction of fact that. 
may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the 
evidence. 
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence. They may be proved also by 
circumstantial evidence or by a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. 
Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as a means of proof. Neither 
is entitled to any greater weight than the other. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
Pursuant to the instructions and directions of the special verdict which is herewith 
submitted to you, it will be your duty to determine the amount of Plaintiffs damages, if any, 
as you may find from a preponderance of the evidence will reasonably and adequately 
compensate Plaintiff for any injury and loss Plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the 
incident and injuries complained of by Plaintiff. 
In determining such damages, you may consider the nature and extent of the injuries 
sustained by the Plaintiff, the degree and character of Plaintiff's suffering, both mental and-
physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which Plaintiff had been prevented 
from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life theretofore enjoyed, and any disability or loss of 
earning capacity resulting from such injury. 
Pain and mental and physical suffering have no market value. They are not capable of 
being exactly or accurately determined, and there is no fixed rule or standard whereby damages 
for them can be measured. You may however make such award for pain and mental and 
physical suffering as will provide an allowance looking toward recompense for or made because 
of suffering resulting from the injury. 
You may also consider whether any of the above will, with reasonable certainty, continue 
in the future. 
All of the foregoing are designated under the law as general damages, and in addition 
thereto you may determine the amount of such reasonable special damages and expenses, if any, 
as you find from a preponderance of the evidence the Plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, has 
incurred for hospitalization, physicians, drugs, nurses, therapists, laboratory expenses, 
orthopedic equipment, travel expenses connected with medical treatment, and other similar 
expenses. 
You are not permitted to award Plaintiff speculative damages by which term is meant 
compensation for detriment which, although possible, is remote, conjectural or speculative. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate, with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. You 
each must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a consideration of the case 
with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to change an opinion if convinced that it is 
erroneous. However, you should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect 
or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the 
opinion of the other jurors. 
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1 INSTRUCTION? AND IF YOU READ ALL OF THAT STUFF — I'M 
2 NOT SAYING YOU NEED TO READ IT ALL, BUT PLEASE, PLEASE 
3 FOR MR. SHARP, READ THIS SENTENCE. "THE MERE FACT 
4 THAT THE EVENT COMPLAINED OF OCCURRED DOES NOT SUPPORT 
5 AN INFERENCE THAT ANY PARTY TO THIS ACCIDENT WAS 
6 NEGLIGENT." IT DOESN'T. AND THAT'S ALL WE HAVE IN 
7 THIS EVENT, AS YOU KNOW IS THE FACT THAT THE ACCIDENT 
8 OCCURRED. IT DID OCCUR AND THAT'S WHY WE'RE HERE AND 
9 MR. SHARP OF COURSE DOESN'T DENY THE ACCIDENT 
10 OCCURRED. WHERE'S THE PROOF THAT HE DID ANYTHING 
11 WRONG IN THIS CASE? AGAIN, MR. HOWARD TRIED TO MAKE 
12 IT SEEM LIKE HIS STORY WAS INCONSISTENT OR DIDN'T HAVE 
13 HIS FACTS STRAIGHT. THAT MAY BE WHAT THE PLAINTIFF 
14 BELIEVES OR HOPED HAPPENED, BUT IT ISN'T WHAT 
15 HAPPENED. WHAT DID HE TELL YOU? HE TOLD YOU I WAS 
16 DRIVING NORTH, SAW WAY AHEAD OF ME. HE NEVER 
17 CONTRADICTED HIMSELF AT ALL. HE ESTIMATED THE 
18 DISTANCE AT ONE POINT AS A FOOTBALL FIELD. IT WAS 
19 POINTED OUT HE HAD SAID 12 CAR LENGTHS BEFORE AND THAT 
20 WAS ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF A FOOTBALL FIELD. HE SAID 
21 QUIT TRYING TO MAKE ME PIN IT DOWN TO FEET. I DIDN'T 
22 HAVE MY MEASURING TAPE. IT WAS A FINE, SAFE DISTANCE. 
23 I DON'T CARE IF IT WAS A HUNDRED YARDS OR 80 FEET, 
24 THERE'S NO SHOWING HE FOLLOWED TOO CLOSE WHEN HE WAS 
25 DRIVING ALONG. THERE'S NO PROOF OF THAT. SO LET'S 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 MOVE ON. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? SHE GOES TO PASS THE 
2 SNOW PLOW AND WE'VE GOTTEN CAUGHT UP IN: DID SHE PASS 
3 IT OR NOT. MAYBE WE'RE PLAYING SEMANTICS. I SAY WHEN 
4 SHE DIDN'T PASS IT, SHE DIDN'T GO AROUND IT AND GO 
5 DOWN THE ROAD. SHE CERTAINLY ATTEMPTED TO PASS IT OR 
6 STARTED TO PASS IT, AROUND THE BACK OF IT. 
7 IT WASN'T MR. SHARP WHO SAID I STARTED 
8 BRAKING WHEN I SAW THE DRIVER. IT WASN'T MR. SHARP 
9 WHO SAID IN HER DEPOSITION IF I WAS PAST HIM, IT WAS 
10 FEET NOT BLOCKS. THE ONLY PERSON THAT SUGGESTED TO 
11 YOU THAT SHE WAS DOWN THE ROAD AND IN THE CLEAR OF THE 
12 DANGER, WASN'T MRS. ANDERSON, IT WAS MR. HOWARD. 
13 FIRST IN THE AFFIDAVIT — AND IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN HIM 
14 PERSONALLY BUT FIRST IN THE AFFIDAVIT PREPARED BY HIS 
15 FIRM AND SECOND IN THE SUGGESTIONS IN OPENING 
16 STATEMENT, AND NOW AGAIN IN CLOSING, THAT SOMEHOW 
17 SHE'S PAST HIM MINUTES AND SHE'S DOWN THE ROAD. SHE 
18 MAY HAVE SAID MINUTES — IT HAD BEEN MINUTES THAT SHE 
19 STARTED PASSING HIM BUT NOWHERE DID SHE EVER SAY I'M 
20 DOWN THE ROAD A THOUSAND YARDS. THE INFERENCE HAS 
21 BEEN ATTEMPTED TO BE CREATED BUT IT'S NOT HIS 
22 TESTIMONY THAT REBUTS THAT, BUT HER VERY OWN 
23 TESTIMONY. SHE SAID SHE WAS ALONGSIDE HIM. THEN 
24 ANOTHER PLACE WE CAN LOOK AND WHAT DID SHE TELL THE 
25 OFFICER? YOU REMEMBER THAT EXHIBIT I HAD TO CUT THE 
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1 TOP OFF? SHE'S NEXT TO THE SNOW PLOW, MAYBE A FEW 
2 FEET IN FRONT. I DON'T KNOW. BUT GIVEN THAT FACT, 
3 WHAT MR. SHARP TOLD YOU IS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT. 
4 SHE'S GONE NOW AND IN A CLOUD OF SNOW AND WHAT DOES HE 
5 DO AT THAT POINT? HE'S NOT TRAVELING TOO FAST. HOW 
6 FAST IS HE TRAVELING? HE'S TRAVELING THE SAME SPEED 
7 MRS. ANDERSON IS TRAVELING, APPROXIMATELY 50, 50 MILES 
8 AN HOUR. REMEMBER THAT'S WHAT SHE SAID ON THE STAND. 
9 BOTH OF THEM 50 MILES AN HOUR, 15 MILES AN HOUR SLOWER 
10 THAN THE SPEED LIMIT. WELL HE'S TRAVELING TOO FAST 
11 FOR THE CONDITIONS. THAT'S WHAT HE DID WRONG. WHAT 
12 HAPPENED WHEN THE CONDITIONS CHANGED, WHEN THE SNOW 
13 PLOW THREW IT THREW IT OR WHATEVER? WE KNOW WHAT THE 
14 POINT IS LIKE. HE DIDN'T WAIT FOR THE CAR TO COME OUT 
15 AFTER THERE WAS A DANGER. HE STARTED TO DO WHAT ANY 
16 OF US WOULD DO. HE STARTED TO SLOW DOWN. AS A MATTER 
17 OF FACT, HE DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO THAT SITUATION 
18 AHEAD OF HIM SO HE DID SLOW DOWN. THEN SHE COMES OUT 
19 OF THE CLOUD BECAUSE SHE'S BRAKING. THE CAR IS AHEAD 
20 OF HER. A SITUATION THAT SHE — AND I THINK WHAT 
21 THEY'RE DOING, BOTH OF THEM IS RELATIVELY THE SAME — 
22 AND I'LL GET TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM IN A 
23 MINUTE — BUT SHE'S DOING THE SAME THING HE HAS TO DO 
24 IN THE SAME SITUATION, SO SHE'S BRAKING TO AVOID CARS 
25 IN FRONT OF HER, JUST LIKE HE'S BRAKING NOT TO JUST 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 AVOID CARS, BUT ON THE OFF CHANCE WHAT HAPPENS IS 
2 GOING TO HAPPEN, THE CAR COMES OUT AND HE'S ALREADY 
3 PREPARED AND ALREADY BRAKING AND ALREADY SLOWING DOWN 
4 BUT DIDN'T GET QUITE SLOWED ENOUGH AND HE BUMPS. WHAT 
5 DID HE DO WRONG? IF YOU READ THROUGH THE NEXT 
6 INSTRUCTIONS THAT TELLS YOU WHAT HE HAS TO DO. I'LL 
7 TRY TO GO THROUGH THIS AS QUICKLY AS I CAN. 
8 THE INSTRUCTIONS ENUMERATE WHAT PEOPLE HAVE 
9 TO DO, A NUMBER OF THINGS: DRIVING A SAFE SPEED -- GO 
10 THROUGH THOSE ONE BY ONE AND ASK YOURSELVES: DID 
11 MR. SHARP VIOLATE ANY OF THESE? COULD HE HAVE DONE A 
12 LITTLE BETTER IN HINDSIGHT? SURE ANY OF US COULD. 
13 NUMBER 10, ASKS YOU WHAT A REASONABLE DRIVER 
14 WOULD DO, NOT A AN EXCEPTIONAL OR PROFESSIONAL DRIVER. 
15 DID HE DO WHAT A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD DO UNDER THE 
16 CIRCUMSTANCES. 
17 15 STATES WHEN A PERSON WITHOUT CARELESSNESS 
18 OR FAULT IS SUDDENLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONTED WITH 
19 PERIL — AND IT GOES ON TO SAY YOU'RE NOT HELD TO THE 
20 SAME STANDARD. IF YOU'RE IN A SITUATION LIKE THAT 
21 THAT AROSE QUICKLY BECAUSE OF THE SNOW, YOU DO THE 
22 BEST YOU CAN. IF YOU HAD CREATED THAT SITUATION, THEN 
23 WE COULD POINT THE FINGER AT THEM. AGAIN UNLIKE OTHER 
24 REAR END ACCIDENTS THIS IS DIFFERENT AND THE REAL 
25 INFERENCE IS, OH, HE HIT HER FROM BEHIND, IT'S HIS 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
VOL. Ill, PG. 229 
1 FAULT. AND THE TRUTH IS NORMALLY YOU ARE. YOU'RE IN 
2 CITY TRAFFIC, NOT LEAVING A PROPER FOLLOWING DISTANCE, 
3 ANY NUMBER OF REASONS. BUT THIS IS A CASE NOT LIKE 
4 OTHER ACCIDENTS. WHERE IS THAT BURDEN? HOW CAN I 
5 REBUT OTHER THAN TO SAY, WELL IT HAPPENED THE WAY IT 
6 HAPPENED. BOTH PARTIES ESSENTIALLY TELL THE SAME 
7 STORY. IT'S ONLY MR. HOWARD WHO SAYS THEY'RE ALL A 
8 THOUSAND FEET DOWN THE ROAD. PLAINTIFF SAID, AGAIN 
9 THREE DIFFERENT TIMES, THAT SHE WAS ALONG THE SNOW 
10 PLOW, EITHER TO THE OFFICER, IN HER DEPOSITION AND THE 
11 FIRST TRIAL. THAT'S HER TESTIMONY. 
12 I MIGHT POINT OUT ONE OTHER THING SHE SAID. 
13 MR. HOWARD MAKES IT SOUND LIKE A NICE SUNNY DAY. IT 
14 MAY HAVE BEEN WHEN SHE STARTED OUT. BUT SHE'S THE ONE 
15 THAT SAID IT WAS BLINDING. AND WHAT I WANT TO DO IS 
16 READ — THIS IS FROM HER TESTIMONY YESTERDAY. WE'VE 
17 GOT ANOTHER TRANSCRIPT NOW. VERY BRIEFLY THE QUESTION 
18 WAS ASKED OF HER: "BECAUSE TO USE YOUR TERM, IT WAS 
19 KIND OF BLINDING AND YOU WERE AFRAID YOU MIGHT STRIKE 
20 SOMEONE IN FRONT OF YOU; IS THAT FAIR? AND SHE 
21 RESPONDED: "THAT'S FAIR." THEN I ASKED, "AND ALSO YOU 
22 NOTED THAT YOU KNEW YOU WOULD BE IN TROUBLE IF THERE 
23 WAS ANYONE FOLLOWING YOU, YOU STATED THAT AS WELL? 
24 YES" WAS HER ANSWER. "DON'T YOU THINK IN FAIRNESS 
25 THAT THE REASON YOU KNEW YOU WOULD BE IN TROUBLE IS 
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1 YOU KNEW THE VISIBILITY WAS SO POOR THAT A DRIVER 
2 BEHIND YOU MAY NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO OBSERVE YOU 
3 SLOWING DOWN; ISN'T THAT FAIR?" SHE ANSWERED, "THAT'S 
4 FAIR." 
5 SHE MAY HAVE SEEN THE ACCIDENT COMING -- NOT 
6 THAT SHE SAW HIM DOING ANYTHING WRONG, BUT SHE KNEW 
7 SHE WAS IN A DANGEROUS SITUATION. ACCIDENTS LIKE THAT 
8 HAPPEN ALL THE TIME. THANK GOODNESS THIS WASN'T 
9 SEVERE. AND I'LL TALK ABOUT THAT NEXT. BUT YOU TALK 
10 ABOUT THESE HORRIBLE ACCIDENTS WE'VE SEEN ON THE 
11 FREEWAY, 40, 50 CARS PILED UP. COULD YOU INFER FROM 
12 THAT EACH ONE OF THOSE DRIVERS HIT FROM THE FRONT WAS 
13 AT FAULT? I SUBMIT THAT ISN'T THE CASE. IN THIS CASE 
14 THE FINGER HAS BEEN POINTED AND IT HASN'T STUCK. 
15 WHEN YOU GET TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, WAS 
16 MR. SHARP NEGLIGENT, NO, HE WAS NOT. AND AS THE 
17 FORMER INSTRUCTION, YOU ANSWER THAT NO AND YOU DON'T 
18 HAVE TO ANSWER ALL OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS. YOU DON'T 
19 HAVE TO GET INTO THE DOCTOR'S RECORDS AND ALL OF THOSE 
20 KINDS OF THINGS. THEY HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
21 BURDEN OF PROOF. THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN THAT HE IS 
22 NEGLIGENT. HAVEN'T PUT IT ON. I THINK I'VE SHOWN BY 
23 HER OWN TESTIMONY, OR AT LEAST ALLOWED YOU TO SEE THE 
24 FACTS THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU TO CONCLUDE THAT HE WASN'T. 
25 HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO YOUR HOPES, I'M NOT 
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1 GOING TO SIT DOWN AT THIS POINT. I APOLOGIZE BECAUSE 
2 I OWE MY CLIENT THE DUTY TO ADDRESS OTHER ISSUES, AND 
3 PLEASE ALLOW ME TO DO THAT IF YOU WOULD BE SO KIND. 
4 THE NEXT QUESTION, OF COURSE IS THE ACCIDENT 
5 ITSELF. AND I WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF OBSERVATIONS 
6 AND SOME OF THEM MAY SPILL BACK OVER INTO THE 
7 LIABILITY CIRCUMSTANCES. 
8 THE FIRST ONE IS THE FORCES INVOLVED. WHAT 
9 KIND OF FORCE DID WE HAVE HERE AT ALL? AND THEN THAT 
10 OF COURSE WILL GO INTO WHAT THE DOCTORS BASED THEIR 
11 TESTIMONY ON. DR. MCCLEAN WAS TOLD THE CAR SPUN OUT 
12 OF CONTROL. MRS. ANDERSON SAYING, GEE, I DON'T KNOW 
13 WHY I TOLD HIM THAT. IT WENT AROUND. THAT WAS HIS 
14 IMPRESSION. OF COURSE SHE CONCEDED NO, IT DIDN'T 
15 HAPPEN. SHE SAID IT WAS FORCEFUL BUT SHE DIDN'T SAY 
16 HER CAR WAS KNOCKED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. SHE JUST 
17 DESCRIBED SOME UNKNOWN FORCE. DR. SMITH WAS TOLD THAT 
18 HER SEAT BROKE AND SHE WAS SHOVED IN THE BACK. I 
19 ASSUME THE WAY THAT WENT, THAT HE THOUGHT HER SEAT 
20 BROKE AND SHE FLEW INTO THE BACK SEAT AND SQUASHED HER 
21 HEAD AND NECK AGAINST THE BACK SEAT. THAT'S THE WAY 
22 IT SOUNDED LIKE DR. SMITH UNDERSTOOD. OF COURSE 
23 THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED. HAD THAT HAPPENED IT WOULD 
24 MAKE A LOT MORE SENSE THAT ~ HIS OPINION WOULD MAKE 
25 SENSE AND YOU CAN SEE WHY HE THINKS WHAT HE THINKS. 
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1 AND THAT'S OF COURSE NOT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE 
2 ACCIDENT. OF COURSE IT WASN'T EVEN 45, IT WASN'T BOTH 
3 SIDES OF THE SEAT. IT WAS TWISTED, ONE SIDE OF THE 
4 SEAT WAS TWISTED. WHATEVER WAS WRONG WITH THE CAR, 
5 HOWEVER WEAK THE SEAT WAS, IT WAS IN A CONDITION WHERE 
6 IT COULD BE PUSHED BACK BY THE PERSON. SO IT DIDN'T 
7 TAKE A LOT OF FORCE TO PUSH IT A LITTLE WAYS BACK OR 
8 CORRECT THE PROBLEM IN THAT CASE. AND WITH APOLOGIES 
9 TO MRS. ANDERSON, I OF COURSE NEED TO POINT OUT SHE'S 
10 A SUBSTANTIAL PERSON AND I THINK THAT WOULD BE A 
11 FACTOR WHETHER A SEAT COULD BE DAMAGED LIKE THAT IN A 
12 ACCIDENT OF THIS MINOR IMPACT AS WELL. 
13 GEEZ, WHO DIDN'T I CALL AS WITNESSES? IF HE 
14 DIDN'T READ IN DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY, IF HE DIDN'T 
15 READ IN DR. MCCLEAN'S I WOULD HAVE. SAME WITH THE 
16 DENTIST. I HAVE NOT TRIED TO KEEP THINGS OUT AND NOT 
17 HAVE YOU LOOK AT THINGS. AND I'VE MADE MISTAKES AND I 
18 APOLOGIZE WHAT'S BEEN TERMED A CLAIM AS OPPOSED TO A 
19 LAWSUIT. THERE'S A WHOLE BUNCH OF FACTS AND I'VE BEEN 
20 THROUGH HUNDREDS OF PAGES TO TRY TO BE FAIR TO MY 
21 CLIENT, AND OF COURSE WE'RE GOING TO MAKE SOME 
22 MISTAKES. I TOLD YOU FOR INSTANCE THAT I THOUGHT WE 
23 WOULD HEAR FROM MR. KNIGHT. AND THE BIGGEST REASON I 
24 WANTED MR. KNIGHT TO TESTIFY, WAS TO EXPLAIN THINGS TO 
25 YOU. I DIDN'T BECAUSE MR. HOWARD DID IT FOR YOU. AND 
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1 HE DID IT QUITE NICELY. HOW THE FORCES WORK IN AN 
2 ACCIDENT. IF YOU'RE HIT FROM BEHIND WITH ENOUGH 
3 FORCE, OF COURSE, YOU'RE GOING TO GO BACK. 
4 ANOTHER THING I WANTED TO TALK ABOUT WERE THE 
5 SPEEDS INVOLVED. I THOUGHT MR. HOWARD WOULD DISCUSS 
6 WE WERE TALKING ABOUT 25 MILES AN HOUR. BUT NO, HIS 
7 WORDS WERE 5 I THINK OR 5 TO 15. BUT THE POINT ~ YOU 
8 CAN LOOK AT THE PICTURES. AND THAT'S WHY I WANTED THE 
9 JURY PANEL ASKED IN VOIR DIRE, IS THERE ANYBODY THAT 
10 HASN'T BEEN IN A LITTLE ACCIDENT WHERE THERE'S BEEN 
11 EITHER LITTLE OR NO DAMAGE TO THE CAR? BECAUSE NOW I 
12 KNOW EVERYONE HAS. YOU ALL KNOW WHAT KIND OF FORCES 
13 WERE INVOLVED IN THIS ACCIDENT. IF THIS WERE A 
14 PICTURE OF A DUCK AND WE WERE ARGUING ABOUT IS THIS A 
15 DUCK OR COW, I WOULDN'T NEED TO BRING A ZOOLOGIST IN 
16 HERE — ALTHOUGH I COULD, AND HE COULD GIVE YOU LOTS 
17 OF GOOD QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPLAIN IT WITH EXPERTS 
18 TERMS AND SCIENTIFIC AND LATIN PARTS — BUT WE DON'T 
19 NEED A SCIENTIST TO TELL US A DUCK IS A DUCK AND WE 
20 DON'T NEED AN EXPERT TO TELL US THIS IS A LOW FORCE 
21 WITH THE KIND OF FORCES INVOLVED HERE. MR. SHARP SAID 
22 I COULD SEE HER. SHE WASN'T THROWN ABOUT THE VEHICLE. 
23 HOWEVER, AGAIN, BECAUSE MR. HOWARD WAS KIND 
24 ENOUGH TO POINT OUT THE FACT THAT THINGS GO THE 
25 OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THAT'S NEWTON'S SECOND LAW OF 
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1 MOTION ~ WITH THOSE WITH THAT PROFESSIONAL 
2 ENGINEERING BACKGROUND — AT LEAST ONE OF HIS LAWS OF 
3 MOTION; FOR EVERY REACTION THERE'S AN EQUAL AND 
4 OPPOSITE REACTION. YOU'RE HIT FROM BEHIND, YOUR CAR 
5 GOES FORWARD, YOU WANT TO REMAIN AT REST AND YOU GO 
6 BACK. 
7 WHERE WERE THE ITEMS IN THE CAR? THEY WERE 
8 IN THE FRONT SEAT, NOT THE BACK. WHERE WERE THE 
9 THINGS ON THE PERSON — WHATEVER, ON THE BACK SEAT? 
10 IF SHE WAS HIT HARD FROM BEHIND THOSE WOULDN'T HAVE 
11 FLOWN TO THE FRONT. THEY WOULD HAVE FLOWN FURTHER TO 
12 THE BACK OR STAYED AGAINST THE BACK SEAT? HOW DID SHE 
13 GET TO THE FRONT? HOW DID MRS. ANDERSON -- AND I 
14 QUIZZED HER IN HER DEPOSITION. HOW COME SHE WAS 
15 THROWN FORWARD RATHER THAN BACK, AS OPPOSED TO HOW 
16 MR. HOWARD DESCRIBED BACKWARDS FIRST, THEN FORWARD? 
17 BECAUSE SHE WAS BRAKING. AND I'VE POINTED OUT SHE 
18 TOLD US SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE SHE WAS BRAKING BECAUSE 
19 SHE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO CARS IN FRONT, SHE HAD TO 
20 BRAKE HARD. SHE MAY HAVE BRAKED — I'M NOT SURE, 
21 BRAKED, BROKE, SLOWED DOWN OR USED HER BRAKES HARD 
22 ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE THINGS TO FLY TO THE FRONT BECAUSE 
23 THAT'S THE ONLY WAY THEY COULD GET THERE, TO CAUSE HER 
24 TO GO FORWARD IN HER SEAT AND AS SHE LET OFF THE BRAKE 
25 SHE WOULD GO BACK, OR AS SHE WAS BUMPED SHE COULD GO 
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X BACK AS WELL IF THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANT FORCE. 
2 THAT'S HOW THOSE THINGS GOT TO THE FRONT. AND THE 
3 FAIR INFERENCE FROM THAT IS SHE SLOWED DOWN QUICKLY IN 
4 THAT SNOW. 
5 I DON'T PARTICULARLY KNOW IF WE OUGHT TO SAY 
6 YES, SHE'S NEGLIGENT AND WEIGH ANY KIND OF NEGLIGENCE. 
7 I'M NOT WILLING TO POINT THE FINGER AND SAY IN THOSE 
8 CIRCUMSTANCES SHE'S WRONG OR IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, 
9 MR. SHARP OUGHT TO HAVE MONEY FOR THAT. THE ONLY 
10 REASON I WANTED THAT ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM IS IF 
11 THE KIND OF THINGS MR. SHARP DID OR DID NOT DO, ARE 
12 NEGLIGENT — WHICH THEY'RE NOT — THEN YOU HAVE TO 
13 WEIGH THAT AGAINST WHAT SHE DID; HOW QUICK DID SHE 
14 BRAKE? HOW QUICK DID SHE SLOW DOWN? HOW CLOSE DID 
15 SHE FOLLOW THAT SHE HAD TO BRAKE HARD ENOUGH THAT 
16 THINGS WENT TO THE FRONT SEAT? ENOUGH ABOUT THAT. 
17 I WOULD SUBMIT TO YOU THERE'S NOT ENOUGH 
18 FORCE IN THIS. AND AGAIN, THAT GOES BACK TO WHAT 
19 MRS. ANDERSON AND MR. HOWARD HOPES YOU HEARD BUT YOU 
20 DIDN'T. MR. SHARP DIDN'T SAY. HE DID SAY, "I DON'T 
21 REMEMBER." I THINK THAT TELLS YOU HE'S A CREDIBLE 
22 MAN. BECAUSE IF HE WAS GOING TO TRY AND HELP HIMSELF, 
23 HE WOULD SAY: ABSOLUTELY I REMEMBER WHAT THAT CAR WAS 
24 LIKE BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. ALL OF THIS WAS PREEXISTING 
25 AS A MATTER OF FACT. HE WOULDN'T HAVE CONCEDED A DENT 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
VOL. Ill, PG. 236 
1 IN THE HOOD AT ALL. HE TOLD YOU WHAT HE COULD 
2 REMEMBER THE BEST AND HE TOLD YOU HE COULDN'T 
3 REMEMBER. BEEN A LONG TIME. MRS. SHARP DIDN'T TELL 
4 YOU WHAT MR. HOWARD SAID AND SHE ALSO SAID I DON'T 
5 KNOW HOW — FIRST OF ALL SHE SAID THE BUMPER WAS 
6 REPAIRED NOT COMPLETELY. WHAT SHE DID SAY WHEN SHE 
7 LOOKED AT NUMBER 48, WHAT SHE DID SAY WAS THAT THE 
8 CONDITION OF THIS BUMPER WAS THE SAME BEFORE THE 
9 ACCIDENT. THERE WAS NO FURTHER DAMAGE. I DON'T CARE 
10 AND MR. HOWARD HAS A GOOD POINT; WELL IT MAY HAVE BEEN 
11 DIFFERENT OR THE PREEXISTING ACCIDENT ISN'T REALLY 
12 THAT RELEVANT. IT'S NOT. THE ONLY REASON I WANT YOU 
13 TO SEE THAT IS WHY THEY'RE DRIVING AROUND WITH A BENT 
14 BUMPER BEFORE THE ACCIDENT. BUT SHE SAID IT WAS THE 
15 SAME BEFORE THIS ACCIDENT. THE ONLY TESTIMONY, THE 
16 ONLY EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE DONE TO EITHER VEHICLE IN THIS 
17 ACCIDENT, IS THE LITTLE — I CALL IT A SCRATCH IF — 
18 IT'S ONLY AN 8TH OF AN INCH DEEP IN THE HOOD. AND 
19 MR. SHARP POINTED IT OUT AND THE PLASTIC GRILL. IT 
20 MADE A SLIGHT DENT IN THE BACK OF THIS CAR AND CAUSED 
21 THE PLASTIC ON A COLD DAY TO BREAK AND PARTIALLY 
22 FALLOUT ON THE ROAD. THINK IF YOU WERE IN THIS 
23 VEHICLE AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES; WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE 
24 FELT IN THAT CAR? WOULD YOU HAVE BEEN INJURED EVEN IF 
25 YOU'RE ARTHRITIC AND HAVE PROBLEMS? WOULD YOU HAVE 
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1 BEEN HURT IN THAT? I THINK THE ANSWER TO THAT IS NO. 
2 REGARDLESS, WHEN YOU GET DOWN TO THE NEXT 
3 QUESTION, WHATEVER YOU SAY ON NEGLIGENCE — AND NOW 
4 I'M ARGUING TO WHAT I THINK YOU DON'T NEED TO GET TO. 
5 MR. HOWARD: I DON'T THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE 
6 TO ASK THE JURY TO PUT THEMSELVES IN THE POSITION OF 
7 SOMEBODY. 
8 MR. PEATROSS: AND I'M HAPPY TO REPHRASE IT 
9 TO CONSIDER. 
10 THE COURT: DO SO, PLEASE. 
11 MR. PEATROSS: PLEASE CONSIDER THE FORCE 
12 EXERTED ON HER IN THIS CAR UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES; 
13 WHAT SHE MUST HAVE FELT, NOT FROM BRAKING HARD BUT 
14 FROM THIS IMPACT. AND USE YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHICH YOU 
15 ARE ALLOWED TO DO IN MAKING THAT CONSIDERATION. 
16 IN ANY EVENT, IF YOU GET TO QUESTION NUMBER 
17 2, WAS HE A APPROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT AND THE 
18 INJURIES? NO, HE WAS NOT. WHATEVER HAPPENED, HE 
19 DIDN'T CAUSE HER ANY HARM IN THIS. SHE DIDN'T TELL 
20 THE POLICE OFFICER, PLEASE CALL AN AMBULANCE OR TELL 
21 ANYONE SHE'S HURT OR TELL MR. SHARP SHE WAS HURT. AND 
22 EVEN IF SHE WAS UPSET AND HAD A MINOR INJURY AND 
23 NOTICED IT WHEN SHE GOT TO SALT LAKE, SURELY IF SHE 
24 WOULD HAVE HAD AN INJURY SHE WOULD HAVE NOTICED IT BY 
25 THE TIME SHE WENT TO THE MOVIES AND TO DINNER. SHE 
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1 DIDN'T. HOURS LATER SHE'S OFF TO THE MOVIES AND IT'S 
2 NOT UNTIL THE NEXT DAY THAT SHE BELIEVES SHE HAS SOME 
3 SORT OF INJURY. I USED OVER-HEADS YOU DIDN'T SEE, AND 
4 ONE OF THEM WAS THE EMERGENCY ROOM RECORD BECAUSE WE 
5 AGREED THE CONTENTS WERE THAT SHE HAD REPORTS THAT SHE 
6 HAD A BACK INJURY OR HIP. SHE WENT AND SAID, "LOOK, 
7 MY NECK HURTS A LITTLE." AND THEY NOTE THERE'S NO 
8 RANGE OF MOTION PROBLEM. IF INDEED, AS MR. HOWARD 
9 SUGGESTED, BASED UPON MR. SMITH'S OBSERVATIONS, BASED 
10 AGAIN UPON HER HISTORY THAT SOME ACCIDENT SOMEHOW 
11 DAMAGED THAT DISC, ONE WOULD THINK THAT HAD TO HURT 
12 AND THEY WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT IN THE EMERGENCY 
13 ROOM. AND YOU REMEMBER HOW IN THE FIRST ACCIDENT AT 
14 SMITH'S, SHE ALREADY HAD THE STRAIN OF THE SPINE. 
15 THAT WASN'T CAUSED OR CREATED FROM THIS KIND OF 
16 ACCIDENT. THAT BRINGS UP A LOT OF OTHER ISSUES RATHER 
17 THAN GETTING INTO DETAIL, I THINK YOU CAN SEE WHERE 
18 HER CONDITION COMES FROM. SHE ALREADY HAD THESE 
19 PROBLEMS. 
20 SO THAT BRINGS ME TO ONE FINAL POINT. AND 
21 PLEASE, I'M JUST GOING PAST MANY OF THE THINGS I 
22 THOUGHT I WOULD GET UP AND TALK ABOUT, BUT I BELIEVE 
23 YOU CAN SORT THROUGH IT. IF YOU BELIEVE YOU NEED TO 
24 GET PAST THAT FIRST QUESTION, AND THAT IS WHAT CAUSED 
25 HER CONDITION AND WHY DID THE DOCTORS SAY WHAT THEY 
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j, DID, YOU KNOW THE HISTORY THE DOCTORS HAD. THEY 
2 WEREN'T IN THE JURY BOX WITH YOU. THEY SAW HER A FEW 
3 MINUTES, AN HOUR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND THEY 
4 HEARD HER SAY I'VE BEEN IN A BAD CAR ACCIDENT AND I'M 
5 HURT, AND NATURALLY ASSUMED, YES, THAT WAS THE CAUSE. 
6 BUT WHAT DID DR. SMITH TELL YOU? "IF SHE DIDN'T TELL 
7 ME SHE WAS IN THE ACCIDENT I WOULDN'T HAVE SAID: HEY 
8 YOU'VE BEEN IN AN ACCIDENT. NEITHER WOULD DR. 
9 MCCLEAN. THESE KINDS OF PROBLEMS, EVERY SINGLE 
10 PROBLEM SHE'S HAD, SHE WOULD HAVE HAD ANY WAY OR 
11 CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO SOMETHING ELSE. IT'S NOT LIKE 
12 WE HAVE TO SCRATCH OUR HEADS AND SAY, GEE HOW COULD 
13 SHE HAVE BEEN HURT IN THIS MINOR ACCIDENT, BECAUSE 
14 THERE'S VERY CLEAR AND OBVIOUS REASONS WHY. 
15 EVEN THE DENTAL PROBLEM. IF YOU LOOK AT DR. 
16 BRIMHALL'S TESTIMONY, HE GOT A LITTLE SURPRISED AT THE 
17 FIRST TRIAL, YOU MAY HAVE REALIZED WHEN HE FIRST HEARD 
18 IT. HE HADN'T HEARD ABOUT THE FALL THING, AND HE HAD 
19 ONLY BEEN A DENTIST A SHORT TIME. HE SAID PEOPLE COME 
20 IN BECAUSE THEY HAVE A JAGGED OR BROKEN TOOTH. SHE 
21 DIDN'T HAVE A JAGGED OR BROKEN TOOTH OFF THIS 
22 ACCIDENT. SHE HAD IT ONLY AFTER EATING RAISIN BRAN. 
23 NOW WHETHER YOU NORMALLY BREAK YOUR TOOTH OFF OR NOT 
24 EATING RAISIN BRAN, HE DIDN'T THINK SO. ANY WE DON'T 
25 KNOW WHETHER IT WAS THE SLIP AND FALL THAT CRACKED IT 
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X OR WHETHER SHE ACTUALLY BROKE HER TEETH WHEN EATING 
2 RAISIN BRAN. SHE DIDN'T EVEN TELL DR. BRIMHALL WHEN 
3 SHE WENT THAT IT WAS THIS ACCIDENT THAT CAUSED IT. 
4 AND THERE'S NO PROOF THERE AND IT'S A GOOD EXAMPLE OF 
5 THE REST OF THE DAMAGES THAT IT'S ALL BASED UPON 
6 SUPPOSITION AND HOPE THAT'S WHAT WAS PROVED WHEN IN 
7 FACT IT WASN'T. 
8 FINALLY, THE DAMAGE FIGURED SUGGESTED -- LET 
9 ME START WITH THE SPECIAL DAMAGES. I DON'T REMEMBER 
10 THE FIGURE, 15,000 SOMETHING FOR THE MEDICALS, 16,000 
11 SOMETHING FOR LOST HOUSEHOLD SERVICES — WHERE IS THE 
12 PROOF AS TO WHICH OF THOSE, IF ANY, WAS CAUSE BY THIS 
13 ACCIDENT? I WOULD SUBMIT THE ONLY ONE THAT'S EVEN 
14 REMOTELY CAUSED BY THIS ACCIDENT IS WHATEVER CHARGE 
15 RELATES FOR THAT FIRST HOSPITAL VISIT THE NEXT DAY. 
16 IF YOU GO THROUGH THE RECORDS — AND AGAIN YOU WOULD 
17 BE GLAD TO KNOW I HAD THOSE ALL STACKED UP FOR 
18 OVER-HEADS AND THOUGHT IT NOT NECESSARY TO GO THROUGH 
19 ALL OF THEM. IF YOU GO THROUGH THOSE RECORDS — AND 
20 IF YOU THINK IT'S NECESSARY, DO IT. OFTEN IN PHYSICAL 
21 THERAPY NOTES IT STATES: SHE CAME IN BECAUSE SHE 
22 SLIPPED AND FELL. HER BACK IS BOTHERING HER TODAY. 
23 SHE LIFTED HER SON WHO WAS INJURED, AS WE FOUND OUT, 
24 HAD TO LIFT AND CARE FOR HIM. AND AT ONE POINT NOTES 
25 HE'S A LARGE INDIVIDUAL. HE'S NOT AS BIG AS ME BUT IT 
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1 SAYS 200 LBS., AND SURE, SHE HAD ARTHRITIS, DOING 
2 THESE THINGS AND SHE'S IN GETTING TREATMENT. BUT 
3 EVERY DOLLAR OF THAT AMOUNT, EVERY PENNY HAS BEEN 
4 CLAIMED IN THIS ACCIDENT WITH ABSOLUTELY NO PROOF 
5 WHATSOEVER. THE ONLY THING DR. SMITH SAID -- AND I 
6 CAN GET OUT OF HIS TRANSCRIPT AND THD QUOTE WAS: "ALL 
7 I COULD TELL FOR YOU SURE, SHE CAME TO SEE ME BECAUSE 
8 OF DISCOMFORT." I THINK WAS HIS WORDS. THAT'S WHEN I 
9 PIN HIM DOWN. THAT'S WHAT HE SAID. APPARENTLY 
10 ASYMPTOMATIC. BUT ALL HE COULD SAY, NOT USING THE 
11 PLAINTIFF'S FACTS, WAS SHE CAME IN, AND HE SAID WELL 
12 THERE'S NO PROOF THAT THAT CAME FROM THIS ACCIDENT. 
13 ALL THOSE BILLS, THERE'S THERAPY FOR LOW BACK, 
14 MID-BACK, FOR HEADACHES, FOR ALL THOSE OTHER THINGS, 
15 EPSTEIN-BARR DISEASE, FIBROMYALGIA, WHICH MAY OR MAY 
16 NOT BE RELATED TO TRAUMA, MICROTRAUMA, THE MOSAICING, 
17 IN DR. SMITH'S WORDS. HOW CAN THEY COME UP AND SAY 
18 WE'VE PROVED IT, IT'S UNREFUTED. I DON'T REMEMBER 
19 AGREEING THOSE BILLS WERE CAUSED FROM THIS CASE, AND 
20 THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO PIN THOSE TO ANY INJURY 
21 RECEIVED IN THIS ACCIDENT. SO IF YOU THINK MY CLIENT 
22 DID SOMETHING WRONG, MR. SHARP DID SOMETHING WRONG, 
23 THE ONLY THING I WOULD SUGGEST, IF SHE DID HAVE SOME 
24 INJURIES, SLIGHT INJURIES, SHE MAY HAVE FELT; I BETTER 
25 GO TO THE HOSPITAL AND GET CHECKED OUT, BECAUSE 
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1 GRANTED SHE'S A NERVOUS, EXCITABLE INDIVIDUAL AND I 
2 THINK WE'VE SEEN THAT, AND SHE IS ENTITLED TO BE 
3 NERVOUS AND EXCITABLE, FRANKLY. THAT'S HER BUSINESS. 
4 IF SHE FELT LIKE SHE OUGHT TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL AND 
5 GET CHECKED OUT AND IT WAS HIS FAULT, THEN YOU CAN 
6 CONSIDER PUTTING IT IN. I DON'T KNOW IF IT'S A 
7 HUNDRED DOLLARS -- YOU CAN LOOK AT THE BILL. I DON'T 
8 KNOW IF IT WAS $400.00. AND THEN IN FAIRNESS IF SHE 
9 NEEDED IT CHECKED OUT, THEN HE OUGHT TO PAY FOR THAT. 
10 BUT THAT'S THE ONLY THING THAT COULD POSSIBLY BE 
11 RELATED. BUT I DON'T THINK IT IS AS FAR AS GENERAL 
12 DAMAGES. SHE WAS EXCITED. IF YOU THINK IT'S FAIR SHE 
13 SHOULD HAVE MONEY BECAUSE SHE WAS SCARED AND WANTED IT 
14 CHECKED OUT, AND DO AS MR. HOWARD SUGGESTS AND GIVE 
15 HER TWO OR THREE TIMES THAT HUNDRED DOLLAR BILL, AND 
16 IF HE WAS AT FAULT AND CAUSED THE ACCIDENT AND IF YOU 
17 THINK IT'S FAIR TO CLAIM THAT, THEN I WOULD SUGGEST 
18 THAT'S WHAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF HE WERE AT FAULT. 
19 BUT NOT TO SAY GIVE US ALL THAT MONEY WITHOUT 
20 CONNECTION, NOT TO TAKE A PERCENTAGE AND A MILLION 
21 DOLLARS, 4 PERCENT, THAT'S 40,000 AND BILLS THEY 
22 HAVEN'T PROVED, THAT'S 50,000. THAT'S HOW YOU ANSWER 
23 THE QUESTION IF YOU GET PAST 1. 
24 I DIDN'T HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF. FOR THAT 
25 REASON, I COULD HAVE SAT AT THIS TABLE AND NOT DONE A 
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I THING BUT GOT UP AT THE END AND SAID THEY DIDN'T PROVE 
% IT, AND THEN SIT DOWN. FOR THAT REASON, BECAUSE IT'S 
3 HIS BURDEN AND NOT MINE. 
4 MR. HOWARD GETS TO GET BACK UP AND TELL YOU 
5 WHY WHAT I'VE TOLD YOU ISN'T TRUE. AND HE'LL DO THAT 
6 AND I'M SURE HE'LL DO A FINE JOB. BUT PLEASE, IF YOU 
7 WOULD, IF I SAY SOMETHING WRONG REMEMBER THE FACTS OF 
8 THE CASE AND NOT THE ARGUMENT. AND PLEASE THINK OF 
9 WHAT — ANALYZE WHAT HE TELLS YOU BASED UPON THE FACTS 
10 AND SEE IF IT'S FAIR. AND THEN GO BACK AND MARK THE 
11 FIRST QUESTION "NO" ON THAT FORM SO WE CAN BE DONE AND 
12 MY CLIENTS CAN GO HOME. THANK YOU. 
13 THE COURT: REBUTTAL MR. HOWARD. 
14 (REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT OF MR. HOWARD) 
15 THE COURT: I ASK THE CLERK TO SWEAR THE 
16 BAILIFF AND TAKE THE JURY IN CHARGE. 
17 (BAILIFF SWORN) 
18 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, IF YOU'LL GO NOW WITH 
19 THE BAILIFF TO COMMENCE DELIBERATIONS, I'LL GIVE YOU 
20 THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THE VERDICT FORM NOW, AND WE'LL 
21 BRING THE EXHIBITS IN IN JUST A MINUTE. 
22 (JURY BEGAN DELIBERATIONS AT 12:40 A.M.) 
23 MR. HOWARD: I NEED TO MAKE A RECORD. I MADE 
24 PART OF IT WHEN YOU WERE OUT. I MADE A MOTION FOR 
25 DIRECTED VERDICT AND NOW I NEED TO MAKE A SUBSEQUENT 
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